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Abstract 
 
Over one hundred thousand Rwandans are currently living abroad as refugees, mostly in 
the nearby countries of east and central Africa. The Rwandan government, under the 
authoritarian leadership of President Paul Kagame, is working to convince both its people 
and the powerful international donor community that Rwanda has recovered, that it has 
reconciled, and that it is now safe for refugees to return. In October of 2009 the United 
Nations’ refugee agency, the UNHCR, issued a recommendation that its “ceased 
circumstances” cessation clauses—Chapter I(C), clauses (5) and (6) of the organization’s 
Convention—be invoked with respect to these Rwandan refugees. These provisions allow 
the UN and refugee asylum countries to determine when the reasons for a particular 
refugee crisis have ended. In July of this year, all remaining Rwandan refugees will lose 
their group refugee status and the legal protection and benefits this status carries. Many 
of them will be forced to repatriate. Citing the crimes of Kagame’s military forces both 
during and after the 1994 Genocide, as well as the repressive political conditions the 
country continues to experience today, Rwandan refugees are concerned that a forced 
return will mean exposure to very real and continued fears and dangers. Confronted by 
both this possibility and by the entirety of their lives and experiences in exile, these 
refugees must continually renegotiate their notions of “home” and “belonging.” 
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Introduction 
 
Everyone I knew is now dead. Why should I go back? What would I go back for? If I was 
there I would think of them, of all those people I love who I saw killed. I still hear them 
dying—now, as I’m talking to you, I hear them. I cannot go back to Rwanda. 
!Rosine, Rwandan Refugee, Nakivaale Refugee Settlement  
 
Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide left a country in ruins. A hundred days of terror forged deep 
physical scars and very tangible destruction: one million people murdered, a quarter of a 
million women widowed, as many raped, one hundred thousand children orphaned or 
lost. Roads and infrastructure were destroyed, the streets lined with rotting corpses, 
livestock and crops ruined, and the economy lay devastated.1  
But the wounds were not only physical and the damage not always measurable 
or quantifiable. The horrors of the Genocide instilled a deep-seated fear in people on both 
sides of the disaster, victims and perpetrators, Tutsi and Hutu.2 Millions were uprooted by 
this fear and the violence it inspired. Even today, nineteen long years after the victory of 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front that ended the conflict, Rwandans continue to leave the 
country. Over one hundred thousand Rwandans are currently living abroad as refugees, 
mostly in nearby east and central African countries.3 Some fled decades ago, forced out 
by the persecution of Tutsi and moderate Hutu that was widespread even before the 1994 
Genocide. Many left during and immediately after the violence of Genocide. And still 
others have escaped in the years that followed, as a reaction to Rwanda’s post-genocidal 
political conditions rather than the Genocide itself. 
                                                 
1 Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (New York, 
NY: Zed Books, 2009), 247-250; Christopher W. Mullins, "‘‘He Would Kill Me With His 
Penis’’: Genocidal Rape in Rwanda as a State Crime," Critical Criminology 17, no. 1 (2009): 16. 
2 Phuong N. Pham, Harvey M. Weinstein and Timothy Longman, "Trauma and PTSD Symptoms 
in Rwanda: Implications for Attitudes Toward Justice and Reconciliation," Journal of the 
American Medical Association 292, no. 5 (2004): 602, 610-612. 
3 UNHCR, UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database: Rwanda Statistics (Geneva: United 
Nations, 2012); Interviews.  
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Recent joint action by the Rwandan government, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, and asylum countries has moved these refugees’ situations to the forefront of 
news and policy. In October 2009 the United Nations’ refugee agency issued a 
recommendation that its cessation clauses—Chapter II, A (ii), clauses (e) and (f) of the 
UNHCR’s Statute4—be invoked with respect to Rwandans who became refugees before 
1999.5 These provisions allow the UN and refugee asylum countries to determine when 
the reasons for a particular refugee crisis have ended. In this case, the UNHCR, acting in 
response to the campaigns and pressure of the Rwandan government, has decided that the 
conditions within Rwanda that led to massive flight of Rwandans throughout the 
twentieth century have ceased to exist, and that it is now safe for them to return. In June 
2013, all remaining Rwandans are scheduled to lose their group refugee status and the 
legal protection and benefits this status carries. Many will be forced to repatriate against 
their will.6 This decision will have enormous repercussions on the lives of individual 
refugees. Its impact can already be felt—efforts to promote voluntary repatriation and to 
sensitize refugees to the possibility of coerced return are well underway. During my 
initial visit to the southern Uganda Nakivaale Refugee Settlement in 2011, and when I 
returned in summer 2012 to listen to their stories, Rwandans were consumed by 
anticipation of their forced return. Often our conversations gravitated towards their fear, 
                                                 
4 UNHCR, Statute of the Office of the United Nations high Commissioner for Refugees, General 
Assembly Resolution 428 (V) (Geneva: United Nations, 1950). 
5 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy for the Rwandan Refugee Situation, 
including UNHCR's recommendations on the applicability of the "ceased circumstances" 
cessation clauses, (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011). 
6 Marissa Elizabeth Cwik, "Forced to Flee and Forced to Repatriate? How the Cessation Clause of 
Article 1C (5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention Operates in International Law and 
Practice," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011): 711-743. 
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hope, or expectations of cessation, and how their lives will change once cessation is fully 
enforced.  
While some transnational human rights organizations have published critical 
reports and recommendations about implementation of the UNHCR cessation clauses in 
relation to Rwandan refugees, my thesis is intended to contribute to a currently limited 
academic scholarship on the impending forced repatriation of Rwandans recommended 
by the UNHCR. The topic of cessation of refugee status more generally remains under-
theorized and under-explored. Still less has been said about the political, psychological, 
economic, social, and other effects such decisions have on the people forced to return. A 
handful of scholars, including Marissa Cwik and Todd Howland,7 have looked 
specifically at the cessation clauses and their impending application to Rwandan 
refugees, though they focus heavily on the legal dimensions of these decisions and their 
validity under international law. David Newbury conducted a fascinating but brief 
analysis of identity and social belonging among Rwandan refugees,8 though not in the 
context of impending cessation. 
 By invoking the cessation clauses, the United Nations and the governments of 
states host to Rwandan refugees are reflecting their interpretations and understandings of 
positive changes in the political and social climate of Rwanda, as well as their desires to 
alleviate the financial, political, and social hardships of hosting large populations of 
                                                 
7 See Marissa Elizabeth Cwik, "Forced to Flee and Forced to Repatriate? How the Cessation 
Clause of Article 1C (5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention Operates in International Law 
and Practice," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011): 711-743; Todd Howland, 
"Refoulement of Rwandan Refugees: The UNHCR's Lost Opportunity to Ground Temporary 
Refuge in Human Rights Law," U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 4 (1998): 
73-101. 
8 David Newbury, "Returning Refugees: Four Historical Pattersn of "Coming Home" to Rwanda," 
Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History, 2005: 252-285. 
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refugees. The threat of mandatory repatriation, of cessation of refugee status, reflects 
both international conventions and the decisions of financially- and polically- strained 
countries of asylum. It has compelled Rwandan refugees to renegotiate and reevaluate 
their notions of “home” and “belonging.” For some Rwandans, both returnees and 
refugees, an attachment to the physical state of Rwanda functions as a primary marker of 
their identity. Others reject this attachment, believing that they no longer belong in 
Rwanda because it was the source of their pain or fear. None have found or created a kind 
of “home” in Nakivaale, the refugee settlement, and as a result many live in a state of 
emotional and legal suspense. The government of Rwanda is eager to prove to its foreign 
donors that the country has made strides towards a successful recovery. It has made real 
progress in rebuilding infrastructures, improving health care, and expanding access to 
education. These tangible recovery efforts have not, however, prompted reconciliation in 
the sense of individual healing, forgiveness, reparation of past wrongs, or the 
establishment of a stable, long-lasting peace. Under President Kagame’s rule, some 
Rwandans still struggle to secure basic human rights such as freedom, governmental 
transparency, and personal safety. The government’s refusal to recognize its own crimes 
and wrongdoings and its increasing intolerance for political dissent are indicative of a 
Rwanda not yet ready to welcome “home” those refugees it has driven into exile. 
The Problem of “Genocide” 
The violence of 1994 Rwanda represents one of the greatest human-driven 
tragedies of recorded history. This conflict differed from Rwanda’s previous 
institutionalized violences in both scale and purpose. While the massacres that began in 
Rwanda in 1959 and continued and intensified in the years leading up to 1994 were 
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perpetrated by one ethnic group against the other, they were not genocide. Under the 
United Nation’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
adopted in 1948, genocide occurs if two conditions are fulfilled—one physical, one 
mental—and are applied to a particular group. The physical component, or actus rea, 
involves committing any one of five genocidal acts9 to or against a defined national, 
ethnic, racial, or religious group. The mental component, or mens rea, describes intent to 
commit such acts against such defined groups. For a situation to be considered genocide, 
these acts must be undertaken for the purpose of destroying the defined group in whole or 
part. 
The question of a targeted, defined group is somewhat difficult in Rwanda. 
Moderate Hutu, as well as Tutsi, were targeted by the country’s Hutu-dominated 
government military, the Armed Forces of Rwanda, or FAR, by an elite “death squad” 
network of President Habyarimana’s supporters known as the akazu, as well as by the 
government-supported, largely Hutu militia group, the interahamwe. Killings and other 
violences were also perpetrated by the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front, or RPF.10 
Because political or ideological identity is not one of the group categorizations provided 
by the Convention on Genocide, in order for the UN, state governments, and other actors 
to recognize a genocide in Rwanda, they would have to find that the conflict was to bring 
about the destruction or elimination of the Tutsi ethnic group, not the destruction of the 
political opposition of the rebel RPF to the ruling party, Habyarimana’s National 
Republican Movement for Democracy and Development, or MRND. In the 1994 
                                                 
9 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
(Geneva: The United Nations, 1948), Article II, (a)-(e).  
10 Christian Davenport and Allan C. Stam, "What Really Happened in Rwanda?," Pacific 
Standard, October 6, 2009; Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond," Journal of 
Refugee Studies 9, no. 3 (1996): 242-243. 
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Rwandan case, the actus rea component of genocide definition is undeniably present: 
massacres by machete, mostly of the Tutsi, occurred on a grand scale all across the 
country.11 This violates Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention: killing members of a 
group and causing members of a group bodily or mental harm. The mens rea factor is 
more subjective, and is what has caused the United Nations and other actors to hesitate in 
recognizing that the conflict occurring was indeed “genocide.” These actors would need 
to determine that the massacres were taking place because the perpetrators were aiming 
to fully or partially eliminate the Tutsi ethnic group.12 
 What happened in 1994 Rwanda is neither straightforward nor clear-cut. Both 
Hutu and Tutsi were killed, and both Hutu and Tutsi were killers. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the Hutu and Tutsi categories are themselves problematic—once flexible 
labels of social class or markers of wealth and political power, they became reconstituted 
as rigid ethnicities under colonial rule. The violence was immense, the destruction total 
and complete: estimates of the dead range between 10,000 and 50,000 Hutu, and between 
500,000 and one million Tutsi. Children were frequent targets. The violence was 
perpetrated by hundreds of thousands—by the RPF, the FAR, the interahamwe, the 
akazu, and by civilians—and millions witnessed it.13 Hunger and starvation were 
rampant.14 Violence began in Kigali, the capital, and by the end of the hundred days of 
terror only one sixth of the city’s population remained, the rest either dead or displaced, 
along with most of the country’s educated elite. Nearly all teachers were gone. In the 
                                                 
11 Philip Verwimp, "Machetes and Firearms: The Organization of Massacres in Rwanda," Journal 
of Peace Research 43, no. 1 (2006): 7, 19. 
12 Melvern, A People Betrayed, 251-252; Eugenia Zorbas, “Reconciliation in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda,” African Journal of Legal Studies 1, no. 1 (2004): 31-32.  
13 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 5-6; Davenport and Stam, “What Really Happened in 
Rwanda?.”  
14 Ibid., 203.  
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whole country, six judges and ten lawyers remained.15 Almost a quarter of Rwanda’s 
surviving population meets the symptom criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
directly as a result of experiencing these violences.16 
 This devastation took place within the context of an ongoing civil war. Starting in 
1990, the rebel RPF army of largely “Tutsi” refugees launched its first small-scale 
invasions of and attacks on Rwanda, and over the next three years, it seized control of 
significant swathes of Rwandan territory. By February 1993, nearly one million Hutu 
peasants had been displaced by RPF actions.17 Hutu power movements strengthened in 
response to these Tutsi-perpetrated violences.18 Labeling what happened in Rwanda in 
1994 “genocide” is complicated by the fact that both “Hutu”-dominated and “Tutsi”-
dominated militias and groups were actively battling each other and implicated in 
producing terror and death. Scholars of Rwanda have voiced their concerns regarding the 
term’s complicated application, stating, “Both sides of the armed conflict had perpetrated 
serious breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity,”19 and 
the “Rwandan crisis presents many elements of a classic civil war.”20 Hutu-dominated 
groups—the MRND government’s FAR and akazu, the interahamwe—were responsible 
for most of the Tutsi deaths, and the Tutsi RPF for many of the Hutu killings. But identity 
categories are hard to distinguish, and groups often killed indiscriminately. Both Hutu 
                                                 
15 Melvern, A People Betrayed, 247.  
16 Pham et al., Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in Rwanda, 602.  
17 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 186-187. 
18 Ibid., 189.  
19 Melvern, A People Betrayed, 253.  
20 William A. Schabas, “Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda: Searching 
for Solutions to Impossible Problems,” Criminal Law Forum 7, no. 3 (1996): 525.  
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and Tutsi took advantage of the violence and chaos to settle old scores—political, 
financial, and personal—through murder.21 
 Though both Hutu and Tutsi were targeted and killed by the government forces—
the FAR and akazu—and government supported forces—the interahamwe, those 
identified as Tutsi or sympathetic or collaborating with them, were disproportionately 
targeted and victimized. Tutsi were constituted as the enemy by Rwanda’s pre-1994 
ruling party, the MRND, and some Hutu victims were seen as their sympathizing 
accomplices. Importantly, violence towards the Tutsi was intended to bring about their 
extermination or elimination, motivated by institutionalized “ethnic hatred” and “racist 
propaganda.” Violence directed at Hutu populations was not.22 There is, therefore, a 
specific ethnic target of the violences, the necessary mens rea component of the United 
Nations’ “genocide” definition. It is with this reasoning that the UN decided to recognize 
the events of 1994 Rwanda as “genocide.”23 Not surprisingly, the Rwandan government 
has done the same. I discuss later how the RPF uses the “genocide” label without 
recognizing any of its own complicity in the violences during and predating 1994. Some 
of my interviewees referred to these violences as “what happened in 1994,” or simply 
with the date, “1994” and others used the word “genocide” to describe the events. I have 
adopted the term Genocide (uppercase) in this paper in reference to the events of 1994 
Rwanda in light of its wide usage and because the victims were disproportionately Tutsi. 
I use it with the understanding that this terror was situated within a larger context of civil 
war, and that the lines between victim and perpetrator, Tutsi and Hutu, were often messy 
                                                 
21 Reyntjens, “Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond,” 242-243, 246-248; Davenport and Stam, “What 
Really Happened in Rwanda?.”  
22 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 194-195; Zorbas, “Reconciliation in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda,” 31-32; Melvern, A People Betrayed, 254-256.  
23 Melvern, A People Betrayed, 253-254.  
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and blurred. I use the lowercase “genocide” or “genocidal” to describe this category of 
crime more generally.  
Research Choices and Contexts 
 I first stumbled upon the Rwandan refugee crisis in the fall of 2011 as a junior at 
Duke University, when I spent a semester living and studying in Kigali, Rwanda’s 
capital. At the time, my academic focus was on African post-conflict restoration and 
recovery processes more generally, a subject I’d become fascinated by after a particularly 
engaging seminar class during my freshman year. I had not yet considered the problems 
and challenges of refugees. The Rwandan government is remarkably adept at presenting a 
front of great social progress and rapid modernization to the international community, 
and initially, I was quite impressed by this cover. As I made Kigali my temporary home, I 
was able to enjoy a comforting sense of security. I wandered the streets and the hills, 
often alone, feeling completely confident and assured. After all the cautions and advice 
from well-intentioned friends and family, I felt safer here—in the heart of Africa—than at 
home in the United States. Rwandans are lucky, I thought, to have this. 
Slowly, I gained a better understanding of this beautiful country and the people 
who had welcomed me into their homes and lives. Rather than answering my questions, 
though, this process prompted me to ask new ones. The armed, uniformed soldiers, who 
stand every few yards along Kigali’s roads, started to make me feel uneasy instead of 
protected. Deflected conversation topics began to seem more uncomfortable than polite. I 
visited Genocide memorials, walked through churches and schools filled with rooms of 
scattered bones and bodies frozen forever in terror. As I grappled with the magnitude of 
tragedy and horror that Rwandans faced in 1994, I was struck by the impossibility of 
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what the country claims to have done—to have moved from total devastation to near-
complete recovery and reconciliation in less than two decades. Many of my newfound 
uncertainties centered on the reasons for Rwanda’s ongoing refugee crisis. A brief trip to 
neighboring Uganda, where I visited a refugee settlement, Nakivale, and spoke with 
Rwandans who continue to feel that they are unwelcome and unsafe in Rwanda, brought 
these questions into even sharper relief. I was unprepared for their raw hopelessness and 
the intensity of their fears. Their stories captivated me.  
 This thesis examines the “making” of Rwanda’s refugees in its twentieth-century 
and more recent history; the factors influencing the UNHCR’s recommendation to 
implement the cessation clauses for Rwandan refugees “made” before 1999; refugee 
responses to being compelled to return “home” irrespective of their desires, fears, and 
traumas; the ways in which refugees and returnees described and understood home and 
belonging; and the Rwandan political context to which Rwandans are being forced to 
return. My investigation draws on a variety of sources: The first category of sources 
includes documents, laws, statements, visual material, and official and unofficial 
discourses (including “news”) produced or sponsored by the current Rwandan 
government; statements from nearby asylum states in east and central Africa; reports and 
recommendations of human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch; and most importantly, documents and statements of the UNHCR 
and other UN organizations. With the exception of the human rights reports, which I use 
for the independent evidence and analysis they may offer, the remaining primary source 
material is read in two ways: as information and as representations that frequently hide as 
much as they tell. The second largest source of primary material comes from interviews, 
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field-notes, and observations I gathered while in Rwanda and southern Uganda (Mbarara) 
in fall 2011 and summer 2012. Interviewees and informants included refugees, returnees, 
government officials, policy-makers, NGO and UNHCR officials, and workers in 
Rwanda’s reintegration offices. For such sources, I analyze phrasings and silences as well 
as what people reported or how they answered questions. The third substantive category 
of sources is relevant peer-reviewed scholarship related to the UNHCR, Rwandan 
history, Rwandan refugees, and genocide. 
I faced a few challenges that limited the content and scope of my research. I found 
the first when speaking with both officials and former refugees in Kigali. The Rwandan 
government has a strong, constant presence in the lives of all Rwandans. This presence is 
certainly visible—streets lined with soldiers, government-printed billboards, and state-run 
news programs and television shows. Flags, advertisements, and pictures and posters of 
the nation’s president, Paul Kagame, are ubiquitous. But the government also has a less 
visible impact: during the semester I spent studying in Rwanda in fall 2011, one of my 
professors confessed to me, when we were both safely outside the country, that he feared 
our classroom space in Kigali could be bugged. Similarly, my host family during both 
stays in Rwanda whispered cautions to me on multiple occasions: “you know you should 
not ask those questions;” “really, you cannot say that;” and “be careful, my sister.” Such 
pervasive government presence and intrusion left a marked influence on the words and 
silences of my interviewees. Some were very careful only to parrot government rhetoric. 
Certain phrases and keywords were repeated to me, verbatim, dozens of times. Other 
topics were completely avoided. I learned as much from the choices my interviewees 
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made in how they said things and what they chose not to say, as I did from the interview 
content.  
Most, though not all, of the refugees I spoke with in the Nakivaale Refugee 
Settlement did not seem confined by these same inhibitions. With them, though, I faced 
other challenges. One was language. In Kigali, the majority of my interviewees spoke 
English or French, and we were able to converse easily in one or both languages. With 
the refugees, I was able to conduct some interviews in English or French, but for 
Kinyarwanda speakers, I required a translator. Though I am confident that my translator, 
a friend of mine, provided me with accurate renderings of our conversations—I speak and 
understand enough Kinyarwanda to comprehend the broad strokes of a dialogue and to 
know when to ask for better, different, or more detailed translations—it was easier for me 
to establish baseline levels of trust and openness in situations where I did not need an 
intermediary. To this end, my identity—young, female student from the United States—
worked to my advantage. I was approachable and unthreatening. I do feel I was able to 
draw meaningful stories and histories from each interview relationship. These stories, and 
the people who told them, are the motivation for and heart of this thesis project.  
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Chapter 1: The Making and Unmaking of Rwandan Refugees 
 
The contemporary Rwandan refugee crisis traces its origins to the waves of Tutsi who 
first fled the country in 1959, in fear of politically-motivated mostly Hutu perpetrated 
massacres and violence. Most of these initial refugees and the Rwandans who fled in the 
decades since have been granted official refugee status by their asylum states based on 
international conventions. These conventions include the 1951 United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Both conventions provide internationally-
accepted definitions of the terms of refugee status and detail the rights and protections 
such status provides. Though they play a large role, the decision to award refugee or 
asylum status is not solely a product of these universal legal protocols. It is also heavily 
dependent on nuanced political agendas and complex state and regional histories. 
 In the Rwandan case, dislocation and war have been produced partly by the 
colonial and post-colonial rigidification of social distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi. 
The ability of Rwandan refugees to determine their fates is complicated by the immense 
economic and other burdens shouldered by countries of asylum and the desire of the 
ruling Rwandan government to repatriate all Rwandan refugees. By invoking the “ceased 
circumstances” cessation clauses, the UNHCR, OAU, and countries of asylum jeopardize 
this refugee status and its attached rights, forcing them to return to Rwanda, irrespective 
of whether they want to return or if the country is safe for their return. 
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The Refugee in International Conventions and State Practices 
 The origin of the term “refugee” as it is used internationally today can be traced to 
the formation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) at the end of the Second World War. The organization’s 1950 Statute included 
an initial definition24 that was revised slightly in the 1951 UNHCR Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees. The Convention defines a “refugee” as any person considered 
such under a number of prior international agreements,25 as well as any person who, 
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
(UNHCR Convention Article I, A (ii)) 
 
Generally speaking, a refugee is a non-criminal forced to flee across an international 
boundary (or boundaries) by either state persecution or fear of the same. The temporal 
constraints listed in the 1951 Convention, as well as a geographic restriction of the status 
to Europeans, were removed by a subsequent UNHCR publication—the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees.  
 Later documents produced by regional organizations added to this definition of a 
“refugee.” Most relevant for my purposes is the Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, a document adopted by the OAU in 1969, which 
                                                 
24 Full text of this initial definition and its subsequent modifications can be found in the 
Appendix.  
25 As listed in the UNHCR’s Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article I, A(i), these 
agreements consist of the United Nations Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928, the 
Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939, and 
the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, the forerunner to the UNHCR. 
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came into force in 1974.26 In this document, the OAU reproduces the definition of a 
refugee in the UNHCR’s 1951 Convention, amended in 1967, and adds: 
[T]he term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part of the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is 
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality. 
(OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
Article I, 2) 
 
This additional provision reflects continental struggles for liberation and independence 
from colonialism through much of the twentieth century. Expanding the refugee 
definition to include those displaced by “events seriously disturbing public order” also 
allows for the inclusion of  “refugees from territories still under colonial or minority 
racist rule.”27 The addition represents the “first time” that “the refugee protection system 
directly addresses the causes of refugee exodus, by focusing on the objective conditions 
in the country of origin.”28 
 Though it is interstate organizations such as the UNHCR and the OAU that define 
the concept and legal term “refugee,” it is their members—individual states that play host 
to asylum seekers—who ultimately decide if such status will be awarded to non-citizen 
individuals or groups. State governments have their own protocols, qualifications, and 
procedures for determining eligibility and awarding refugee status, based on their 
interpretation and application of international refugee conventions and their own state 
                                                 
26 The Organization of African Unity, today called the African Union or AU, is an 
intergovernmental organization founded in 1963 by 32 states on the African continent. Today, it 
includes 54 countries—every African nation except Morocco. See the organization’s website, 
www.au.int. 
27 George Okoth-Obbo, "Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 Refugee Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa," Refugee Survey Quarterly 20, 
no. 1 (2001): 112. 
28 M. R. Rwelamira, "Two Decades of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa," International Journal of Refugee Law, 1989: 558. 
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laws and policies. State apparatuses have the most flexibility in awarding refugee status 
when they are considering asylum seekers on an individual rather than prima facie basis. 
They also have more control when asylum seekers attempt to establish themselves in 
cities and other urban areas, rather than in camps or settlements that are partially 
sponsored or run by the UNHCR or other intergovernmental organizations. Often, the 
personnel making status determinations have received little or no legal training, and their 
decisions as to whether or not to award refugee status can be highly subjective.29 
Similarly, legal decisions as to whether an entire group should be treated as a category of 
refugee are often related to the political, ideological, or economic interests of states.30 
 The granting of refugee status—legal, temporary residence in a country of 
asylum—by state governments is important for a number of reasons. Initially, such status 
is supposed to prevent prosecution for illegal immigration or residency and allow people 
to gain employment legally. Other rights attached to refugee status, according to the 
UNHCR, should be equal treatment to nationals with respect to education, public relief 
and assistance, social security, and labor regulations; free movement within their country 
of asylum; and temporary travel documents to facilitate movement to other countries. 
Refugees should also be protected from arbitrary expulsion, or refoulement, according to 
                                                 
29 See Martin Jones, "Refugee status determination: three challenges," Forced Migration Review, 
no. 32 (2009): 53-54; Andrew E. Shacknove, "Who is a refugee?," Ethics 95, no. 2 (1985): 283;  
Alice Edwards, "Refugee Status Determination in Africa," African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 14 (2006): 205, 207. 
30 An example of how this type of state decision-making process can affect whole groups of 
refugees is the “wet foot, dry foot” policy of the United States, embodied in its 1966 Cuban 
Refugee Adjustment Act (public law 89-732). This law was a product of the cold war, an 
opportunity for Cubans living under communist rule to enjoy a quick path to legality in the 
United States regardless of how they entered the country, or for what reasons they fled. See 
Matthew A. Pingeton, "United States Immigration Policy: Detaining Cuban Refugees Taken from 
the Sea," Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, 1999: 331-332. 
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UNHCR conventions.31  In practice, state governments struggle to meet the requirements 
outlined by the UNHCR and often are unable to provide refugees with the rights and 
protections such status should offer. Even the United States, a country with vast 
economic resources and a developed legal system, has refused to provide its refugees 
with these rights. This neglect was sanctioned by a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which ruled that refugees are not “entitled” to any of the rights detailed by the UNHCR.32 
The Cessation of Refugee Status 
Refugee status is meant to be transitory, a temporary solution to a temporary problem. 
Life as a refugee is incredibly taxing, and efforts to sustain a large, poor, often 
traumatized foreign population can put a great deal of strain on sociopolitical and 
economic conditions in asylum countries. To ensure that a refugee crisis does not last 
longer than necessary, the international community has developed measures detailing 
when, why, and how refugee status can cease. Found in both the UNHCR’s 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the OAU’s 1969 Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the cessation clauses 
allow the United Nations, in partnership with refugee asylum countries, to determine 
when a particular refugee crisis has ended. These clauses dictate when a particular 
refugee or group of refugees can no longer be characterized as such under the definitions 
of the term “refugee.” 
 In the UNHCR Convention, there are six general cessation clauses that fall into 
two broad categories: those determined by the actions of an individual refugee, and those 
applied because of changed circumstances in a refugee’s country of origin. Included in 
                                                 
31 UNHCR, Convention, Chapters II-V. 
32 James C. Hathaway and Anne K. Cusik, "Refugee Rights are not Negotiable," Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal 14 (2000): 514. 
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the first group are refugees who voluntarily re-acquire a lost nationality, voluntarily 
acquire a new nationality, voluntarily return to the country from which they originally 
fled, or voluntarily benefit from the protection of the country from which they originally 
fled. To be invoked, all four of these clauses require voluntary, positive action on the part 
of an individual refugee. If a refugee knowingly takes one or more of the four mentioned 
actions, his or her refugee status will cease, and he or she will lose the international 
protection and benefits this status carries.33 
 The final two clauses—the ones on which this research project focuses—are 
known as the “ceased circumstances” cessation clauses. Unlike the first group of clauses, 
which cannot be implemented without the specific action of an individual refugee, this 
category is imposed on refugees. The United Nations and asylum countries decide when 
these clauses are implemented. In the UNHCR Convention, the text of these clauses state 
that a person who was once a refugee will cease to be such if 
he can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been 
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of 
the protection of the country of his nationality; Provided that this paragraph shall 
not apply to a refugee falling under section A(I) [criteria to be considered a 
refugee] of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of 
previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country 
of his nationality;(Article 1, C(5)) 
 
Or if, 
 
being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in 
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, 
able to return to the country of his former habitual residence; Provided that this 
paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A(I) of this article 
who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for 
refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence. 
(Article 1, C(6)) 
 
                                                 
33 UNHCR, Convention, Chapter 1, Article 1 (C), 1-4. 
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In other words, the UNHCR can work with refugee asylum states to invoke the “ceased 
circumstances” cessation clauses if it believes that the situation is safe for a refugee or 
group of refugees to return to their home countries, and that their fear of return is no 
longer legitimate or justifiable. 
 The OAU document features a first group of clauses identical to the ones 
espoused by the UNHCR. Unlike the UNHCR Convention, however, the OAU text only 
lists one “ceased circumstances” cessation clause, which asserts that a refugee will lose 
his refugee status if, 
he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he was 
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of 
the protection of the country of his nationality. (Article 1, 4(e)) 
 
The OAU does not repeat the clause for those having no nationality, nor does it specify 
that individuals may raise exceptions. The UNHCR’s Convention does both. Though the 
issue of no nationality is not particularly relevant to the Rwandan context (especially 
because the Rwandan government is actively trying to get its citizens to return), the idea 
of individual exceptions to cessation is highly important for those Rwandans still 
reluctant to return and who are looking for a way to stay.  
 Besides cessation, a refugee may also lose his or her status through cancellation or 
revocation. It is important to note that each of these is a legally distinct process with a 
different set of justifications: “cancelation” involves invalidation of refugee status when 
the UNHCR or the country of refugee asylum determines that such status was 
inappropriately awarded initially—that person should never have been categorized as a 
refugee. “Revocation” occurs when a refugee commits a serious non-political crime or is 
found to have previously committed such a crime as described in the 1951 UNHCR 
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Convention. Cancelation and revocation therefore differ from cessation, since in the 
former situations, the refugee who once rightfully had this status loses it either through 
criminal action or a decision that refugee status was wrongly awarded in the first place.34  
 Provided that a refugee once had a real and justifiable fear of residence in his or 
her country of origin or nationality, there is a great need to ensure that cessation is not 
invoked prematurely or inappropriately. The United Nations has issued recommendations 
and guidelines related to implementation of cessation clauses that are designed to aid 
states in making such determinations. These include a description of measures 
appropriate to assess whether or not circumstances in the country of origin have changed 
sufficiently to allow for refugees’ return. Change must be both “fundamental”—such as a 
regime change or an end to armed conflict and a return to peace—and “durable”—proven 
to be long-lasting, especially if change in rule took place violently, as it did in Rwanda. 
Returning refugees must be guaranteed physical safety, a functioning government and 
justice system, and adequate basic human rights. Those refugees with “compelling” 
personal reasons should be exempt from the cessation clauses, according to the UNHCR. 
These include refugees who were former prisoners and those who witnessed violence or 
suffer from psychological trauma. Individual asylum countries are largely responsible for 
making these determinations, however,35 subjecting refugees to vastly different standards 
and decision-making processes that may or may not be fair and rigorous in their 
assessments and determinations. Asylum countries will often not present refugees with 
these alternatives to cessation, instead forcing on them a repatriation that is, in a legal 
                                                 
34 UNHCR, Note on the Cancellation of Refugee Status, (Geneva: United Nations, 2004); 
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1c 
(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Ceased 
Circumstances" Clauses), (Geneva: United Nations, 2001). 
35 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection, par. 8, 10-16, 20-21.  
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sense, “voluntary,” but that actually constitutes a “depravation of meaningful free 
choice.”36 
A state invoking the cessation clauses for a group of refugees within its borders 
undertakes a number of responsibilities, according to the UNHCR. First of all, there must 
be a public declaration of cessation, and refugees should be provided with information 
and counseling about their options. Cessation can’t take place immediately—time is 
needed for refugees to make arrangements, either to return to their home country or to 
legalize their status in their country of asylum. Host states must also give individual 
refugees the opportunity to appeal the cessation of their status and to gain exemption if 
appropriate.37  Refugee host states, though, have been reluctant to offer refugees with 
these alternatives to repatriation. Oftentimes, their goal in making refugee status and 
cessation determinations is not whether or not an asylum seeker qualifies under 
international treaties, but whether they have the ability or resources to support them. 
Once granted status, refugees can be “pressured” to “choose” repatriation, so that host 
states are relieved of the burden of accommodating them.38 Though the formal invocation 
of the cessation clauses for Rwandan refugees has not yet occurred, Uganda has already 
undertaken several actions that call into question its compliance with UNHCR’s cessation 
                                                 
36 Jeremy R. Tarwater, "Analysis and Case Studies of the "Ceased Circumstances" Cessation 
Clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention," Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 15 (2001): 610. 
37 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection, par. 25. 
38 Jeremy R. Tarwater, "Analysis and Case Studies of the "Ceased Circumstances" Cessation 
Clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention," Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 15 (2001): 569-
570. 
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procedures. These include the “lack of notice, inability for individual [refugee] review, 
abrupt closure of camps, and destruction of homes.”39 
Since the UNHCR’s formation, it has applied the “ceased circumstances” 
cessation clauses to refugees from fifteen separate national groups. Among the most 
recent refugee crises to receive this treatment are Chileans, following democratic 
elections and large-scale voluntary repatriations; Malawians, after their country drafted a 
new constitution; and Namibians, after Namibia attained independence and held 
elections.40  In 2003, the UNHCR and state governments also collaborated to mandate the 
repatriation of over 500,000 Angolan refugees from the DRC, Zambia, and Namibia. 
Both Angolan and Namibian refugees were “deeply opposed” to these repatriation 
efforts, as “no sound case could be made that conditions in either Namibia or Angola had 
yet reached the point where state parties could validly deem their refugee status to have 
come to an end.” These decisions were based more on logistical, political, and financial 
concerns of asylum countries than on the wellbeing or safety of the refugees they were 
forcing to return.41  
Origins of the Refugee Crisis in Rwanda 
 The Rwandan refugee crisis began in 1959, not long after the United Nations first 
recognized the term in 1951. The country’s minority Tutsi, who make up about fifteen 
percent of the population, were often politically favored under Belgian colonialism. The 
majority of the population, about 84 percent, are Hutu. The use of the term “ethnic” to 
                                                 
39 Marissa Elizabeth Cwik, "Forced to Flee and Forced to Repatriate? How the Cessation Clause 
of Article 1C (5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention Operates in International Law and 
Practice," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011): 738. 
40 UNHCR, Note on Cessation Clauses, (Geneva: United Nations, 1997), par. 32.  
41 James C. Hathaway, "The Rights of States to Repatriate Former Refugees," Ohio State Journal 
on Dispute Resolution 20, no. 1 (2005): 222-223. 
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describe Rwanda’s Hutu and Tutsi peoples is hotly debated, and I employ it here purely 
for reasons of simplicity and convenience. Before colonization, the terms were used more 
as relative indicators of socioeconomic status—settled peasants, lower class, were usually 
Hutu, and cattle herders, high class, were usually Tutsi—rather than ethnic or cultural 
labels. Interaction, mobility, and marriage between and across the two groups were 
common. A single Rwandan could be Hutu in one context and Tutsi in another, the 
identities shifting as a reflection of relative situational statuses.42 Under German and later 
Belgian rule, however, the divisions were standardized and differences were categorized 
and racialized. These processes were based on a number of arbitrary factors defined by 
the colonizers, including nose width and number of cows owned, measured and counted 
by the Belgian administrators. From the time of independence in 1962 until the 1994 
Genocide, these group identities were further strengthened and manipulated by various 
Rwandan partisan leaders for political gain. Most recently, president Paul Kagame has 
prohibited Rwandans to self-identify along these lines, calling instead for a single, unified 
Rwandan people.43  Though the government has undertaken these efforts to de-ethnicize 
the country under the pretense of promoting national unity and reconciliation, this 
prohibition allows it to persecute those Rwandans who continue to vocalize or spread 
Hutu-Tutsi categories for “divisionism.” It also helps to hide the Tutsi-dominated nature 
of Kagame’s government. Ethnicity continues to play an important role in the lives of 
many Rwandans, and ignoring it brews resentment and perpetuates division.44  
                                                 
42  David Newbury, "Understanding Genocide," African Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1998): 83-86; 
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in 
Rwanda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 43-88. 
43 See Mamdani, When Victims become killers, 98-103, 134-142, 266. 
44 Susanne Buckley-Zistel, "Nation, narration, unification? The politics of history teaching after 
the Rwandan genocide," Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 1 (2009): 47-48. 
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 In 1959, Hutu political groups violently revolted against the Tutsi-dominated 
government. Over 200 Tutsi members of the political elite were killed in insurrections 
that spread throughout the countryside.45 Ultimately, the collective violence against 
Tutsis united Hutu-dominated organizations, which successfully seized political power 
through elections, while the country remained under Belgian rule in 1960. The 1959 
revolt prompted the first large-scale flight of Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, who sought refuge 
in the surrounding countries of Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and what is today called the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The Hutu-dominated government continued to 
sanction physical and institutional violence against Rwandans categorized as Tutsi. 
Additional waves of mostly Tutsi refugees fled Rwanda in 1967 and 1973 as a result of 
institutionalized political violence.46 Periods of moderate Hutu-Tutsi violence continued 
over the next decades, mostly taking the form of state-sanctioned Hutu massacres of Tutsi 
civilians. In response, the Tutsi refugees living abroad began organizing attacks on their 
homeland. In 1987, the rebel refugees formed a group called the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 
or RPF, and launched assaults against the government of Rwanda in 1990 and 1991 under 
the leadership of Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s current president. This drove Hutu and Tutsi 
Rwandans to seek asylum abroad.47 
 And then Genocide: the assassination of Rwandan president Habyarimana on 6 
April 199448 served as catalyst to one of the worst episodes of violence the world has 
                                                 
45 Mamdani, When Victims become killers, 116-131. 
46 See Aimable Twagilimana, Historical Dictionary of Rwanda (Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 
Inc., 2007), xxx, 140-142; Mamdani, When Victims become killers, 103-131. 
47 Twagilimana, Historical Dictionary of Rwanda, 140-142; Mamdani, When Victims become 
killers, 175, 186-189.  
48 The persons or party responsible for Habyarimana’s assassination are unknown. See Philip 
Gourevitch and Paul Kagame, "After Genocide: A Conversation with Paul Kagame," Transition 
72 (1996): 166.  
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ever seen. One million people were killed in the span of just one hundred days. Killings 
were an organized and systematic attempt of extremist Hutu forces to wipe out the Tutsi 
so-called inyenzi, or cockroaches. Gendered violence has also played a large role in the 
Rwandan conflict, both in inciting fear and terror and in producing and institutionalizing 
ethnic differences. Rape was used as a systematic, fear-inducing tactic of war. Between 
100,000 and 250,000 Rwandan women49 were raped during the hundred days of terror. It 
is difficult to get an accurate estimate as rape often preceded murder, and those who 
survived are often reluctant to admit or acknowledge rape because of the tremendous 
social stigma attached to it.50 As a genocidal strategy, mass rape can be used to “render 
women from the target population incapable of bearing children,” or to “change the 
ethnic make-up of the next generation.”51 It represents a kind of “ethnic cleansing,” in 
which both mental and physical trauma can handicap a population and prevent its 
continuation.52 In Rwanda, rape of was used as a “weapon to humiliate or degrade” 
women. Though the country habitually practices public collective mourning for those 
who were murdered during Genocide, these living victims often suffer in a shamed 
silence.53  
                                                 
49 These estimates come from United Nations, Sexual Violence: A Tool of War, Outreach 
Programme on the Rwandan Genocide and the United Nations (Department of Public 
Information, 2012), 1. Other sources put the number of women raped in Rwanda during Genocide 
as high as 500,000. See Lisa Sharlach, "Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, 
and Rwanda," New Political Science 22, no. 1 (2000): 98-99. 
50 Sharlach, “Rape as Genocide,” 98-99. 
51 United Nations, Sexual Violence: A Tool of War, Outreach Programme on the Rwandan 
Genocide and the United Nations (Department of Public Information, 2012), 1. 
52 Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, "Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of War," 
Body and Society 11, no. 1 (2005): 113. 
53 Donatilla Mukamana and Petra Brysiewicz, "The Lived Experience of Genocide Rape 
Survivors in Rwanda," Journal of Nursing Scholarship 40, no. 4 (2008): 380. 
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In response to this and other forms of violence, rebel Tutsi refugees invaded under 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front, employing violence of their own against the Hutu and 
ultimately ending the genocide in July 1994. Though most of the Genocide’s victims 
were Tutsi, and most of its perpetrators Hutu, both victim and perpetrator could be found 
on either side of the ethnic divide, and everyone was affected. Fear does not discriminate. 
The violence of 1994 has been the single greatest source of refugees in Rwanda’s history. 
Both Hutu and Tutsi fled.54 
Political Rule by the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
 After the 1994 Genocide, the Tutsi RPF seized control of the government and 
established itself as the ruling party of Rwanda. Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu who joined 
the RPF after his brother was assassinated by the previous Hutu-dominated ruling 
government,55 was appointed president and held the position until his resignation in 2000. 
His status was never much more than a cover for the control and power exercised by Paul 
Kagame, Vice-President under Bizimungu, who has served as the nation’s president since 
Bizimungu resigned.56 Kagame’s authoritarian government has retained control through 
creation of a carefully controlled climate of fear and political repression. The government 
regularly uses its role in ending the 1994 Genocide as a source of legitimacy. It has 
strategically crafted an official narrative of the 1994 Genocide and its causes to 
                                                 
54 Twagilimana, Historical Dictionary of Rwanda, 62-68, 140-142; Mamdani, When Victims 
Become Killers, 185, 218-221, 225-230. 
55 BBC News, "Analysis: Why Bizimungu Mattered," BBC News, March 23, 2000. 
56  After his resignation, Bizimungu attempted to form a new opposition political party, the Party 
for Democracy and Renewal, or PDR-Ubuyanja. His actions, as well as unfounded accusations of 
“divisionism,” led to his arrest and imprisonment in 2002. Bizimungu was released after 
receiving a presidential pardon from Kagame in 2007. See Constance Morrill, "Show Business 
and 'Lawfare' in Rwanda: Twelve Years after the Genocide," Dissent 53, no. 3 (2006): 16; Arthur 
Asiimwe, "Rwanda's ex-president freed from prison," Reuters, April 06, 2007; BBC News, 
"Analysis: Why Bizimungu Mattered," BBC News, March 23, 2000. 
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communicate that there has been state-led reconciliation, progress, and recovery, and to 
appeal to powerful states, funding agencies, investors, and tourists. The government 
narrative presents a very polarized, uncontestable version of the truth in which all the 
Tutsi are victims, all the Hutu are perpetrators, and the RPF and Kagame in particular are 
god-like saviors of a nation that was in ruin. Any alternative narratives are deemed to be 
false and their authors punished or delegitimized. Constance Morrill contends that such 
regime discourses are nothing but “show business” in which the 1994 Genocide “is 
manipulated for political advantage.”57 On the whole, these ruling government efforts 
have been successful: total overseas development assistance (ODA) constituted an 
average of nearly a third—29.7%—of the country’s GDP in the decade following the 
genocide.58 
 The Kagame government has habitually and systematically worked to silence 
voices of dissent and opposition. Among the most tangible expressions of the stifling 
political climate are Rwanda’s laws against “genocide ideology” and “divisionism” or 
“sectarianism,” which severely limit free expression. Rwandan laws also criminalize acts 
like “boasting” and “laughing at one’s misfortune.” Before the Genocide, dehumanization 
of people categorized as Tutsi was institutionalized and reproduced through newspaper 
depictions and cartoons of the Tutsi as devils, snakes, or cockroaches. Regular radio 
broadcasts spread hate propaganda and disseminated unsubstantiated origin myths that 
placed the Tutsi as outsiders with Ethiopian roots. This powerful racializing discourse 
was pervasive and circulated under the guise of “freedom of speech,” not surprisingly 
                                                 
57 Morrill, "Show Business and 'Lawfare' in Rwanda,” 17.  
58 Kene Ezemenari, Ephraim Kebede and Sanjal Lahiri, The Fiscal Impact of Foreign Aid in 
Rwanda: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (The World Bank: Africa Region, Poverty and 
Economic Management 3 Division, 2008), 1.  
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contributing to the 1994 Genocide.59 The Kagame government passed anti-sectarian 
expression laws, ostensibly to ward off future possibilities of genocide. Though this is a 
justifiable aim, the government has actually used these laws to “criminalize speech 
protected by international conventions” and to punish “criticism of the government and 
legitimate dissent.”60 Keeping these laws vague and ill-defined but attached to serious 
punishments, including the possibility of life imprisonment, creates confusion, fear, and 
reluctance to speak openly, even among those who have not been directly subjected to 
such accusations. Children found guilty of genocide ideology can be put in prison, as can 
their parents or teachers if it is proven they have “inoculated” them with this genocide 
ideology.61 A number of teachers, journalists, politicians, and ordinary citizens have been 
punished under these laws,62 which Amnesty International calls an “impermissible 
restriction of freedom of expression” and a violation of international human rights law.63 
Thanks in large part to these and other policies of the Kagame government, thousands of 
Rwandan refugees fear return. 
Rwandan Refugees Today 
Rwanda has produced multiple waves of refugees that resulted, at its peak, in a 
crisis of over three million refugees.64 Table 1: Timeline of the Rwandan Refugee Crisis, 
provides a chronological summary of refugee flight from Rwanda. I begin with the wave 
of Tutsi refugees who left in 1959, when anti-colonial struggles coupled with Hutu efforts 
                                                 
59 Gregory H. Stanton, "Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented?," Journal of 
Genocide Research 6, no. 2 (2004): 214-215. 
60 Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of Rwanda's Laws on 'Genocide 
Ideology' and 'Sectarianism' (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2010), 7. 
61 Ibid., 1415, 17-18. 
62 Fahamu: Networks for Social Justice, Rwanda: Cessation of Refugee Status is Unwarranted: 
Memorandum of Fact and Law (The Fahamu Refugee Programme, 2011), 10-14, 18-19. 
63 Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent, 14, 16. 
64 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, par. 11. 
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to seize power forced many to flee.  The subsequent entries reflect times of particular 
importance—either in cause or number—of refugee crisis, including a wave of political 
dissenters whose numbers continue to grow today. 
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Table 1: Timeline of the Rwandan Refugee Crisis
65
 
*These estimates may also include internally displaced peoples, or IDPs, in addition to refugees. 
 
                                                 
65 Interviews; Twagilimana, Historical Dictionary of Rwanda, 140-142; Jeremy R. Tarwater, 
"Analysis and Case Studies of the "Ceased Circumstances" Cessation Clause of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention," Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 15 (2001): 586-588; Mamdani, When 
Victims Become Killers, 254; Newbury, “Returning Refugees,” 258-261, 270-274, 276-280; 
David S. McDonough, "From Guerrillas to Government: post-conflict stability in Liberia, Uganda 
and Rwanda," Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008): 368; Catherine Newbury, "Background to 
Genocide: Rwanda," A Journal of Opinion 23, no. 2 (1995): 12. Compiled by author. 
Date Refugee 
Identity 
Causes of Flight Approx 
No. 
Has the 
group 
returned? 
Impacted 
by 
Cessation
? 
1959 Tutsi Violent attempts of the Hutu party, 
PARMEHUTU, to seize power 
from the colonially-favored Tutsi 
20,000-
100,000 
Mixed Yes 
1963-1964 Hutu, Tutsi Attacks on Rwanda by Rwandan 
refugees in exile; retaliation 
massacres by the Hutu-dominated 
government 
100,000 Mixed Yes 
1967 Tutsi Widespread massacres championed 
by the PARMEHUTU 
Not 
available 
Mixed Yes 
1973 Tutsi Massacres, Tutsi blocked from 
higher education and government 
jobs 
Not 
available 
Mixed Yes 
1990 Political 
dissenters— 
Hutu and Tutsi 
RPF-led attacks; the unstable 
regime of then-president 
Habyarimana; Massacres of Tutsi. 
80,000 Mostly yes Yes 
1991 Hutu, Tutsi RPF-led attack 270,000* Mostly yes Yes 
1992 Tutsi Large-scale attack of Tutsi by 
Habyarimana’s regime 
600,000* Mostly yes Yes 
1994 Mostly Tutsi, 
some Hutu 
Genocide 1,425,000-
2,000,000 
Mixed Yes 
1994-1996 Mostly Hutu, 
some Tutsi; 
Those accused 
of being 
genocide 
perpetrators 
(largely Hutu). 
The RPF-led government launches 
attacks on Congolese camps; 
Genocide reprisal killings; Fear of 
imprisonment for real or suspected 
perpetration of Genocide 
60,000-
600,000 
Mostly 
yes—in 
response to 
Rwandan 
govt attacks 
on refugee 
camps in 
1996 
Yes 
1996-1998 Political 
dissenters—
both Hutu and 
Tutsi 
Government 
persecution/intolerance; Fear of 
Genocidal reprisal killings; some 
social pressures 
Not 
available 
Mostly no Yes 
1999-present Political 
dissenters—
both Hutu and 
Tutsi 
Government 
persecution/intolerance 
Not 
available 
Mostly no Not 
officially, 
though 
some 
refugees 
fear blanket  
cessation. 
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 While most of these refugees have returned to Rwanda, some 100,000 continue to 
live in several asylum countries, largely in eastern and central Africa.66 These remaining 
refugees fall into six categories, some of which parallel categories in Table 1: 
1. Pre-Genocide Refugees, fled Rwanda, or their families fled Rwanda, before 1994. 
These refugees have been living abroad for over eighteen years, in some cases as long 
as fifty years. The majority are Tutsi and have forged strong ties with communities in 
their country of asylum. A proportion were born abroad but do not have citizenship in 
their country of birth, retaining their parents’ Rwandan nationality and refugee 
identity, despite never having lived in Rwanda. 
2. Tutsi Genocide Survivors, fled Rwanda in 1994 because they or their families were 
targets of genocidal violence or they feared personal harm due to genocidal violence. 
3. Hutu Genocide Survivors, fled Rwanda in 1994 because they or their families were 
targets of violence or they feared personal harm due to violence. Many people in this 
category were persecuted for sympathizing with the Tutsi or opposing Hutu-
organized promulgation of genocide ideology. Others were victims of violent RPF 
attacks. 
4. Genocide Perpetrators, participated in the 1994 genocide and fled before they 
could be brought to justice.  
5. The Poor, refugee camp officials and some Rwandan academics have found that 
particularly destitute Rwandans of all groups saw refugee status in surrounding 
countries as a potential escape from extreme poverty after the 1994 Genocide. 
                                                 
66 UNHCR, UNHCR Statistical Online Poplation Database: Rwanda Statistics, (Geneva: United 
Nations, 2012). 
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6. The Politically-Persecuted, comprise dissidents who fled the government of Paul 
Kagame in fear given the regular disappearance of opponents or perceived opponents, 
and government mistreatment of them and their families. This group includes both 
Hutu and Tutsi and continues to grow today.67 
 Table 1 describes why Rwandans were initially forced to flee, which does not 
necessarily align with why particular individuals or families remain refugees. Reasons for 
remaining outside Rwanda vary and depend as well on factors such as familial and other 
connections in asylum countries, date of departure, degree of absorption by asylum 
country, continued trauma, unwillingness to return to Rwanda under any circumstances, 
knowledge or fear of the situation in contemporary Rwanda, a desire to avoid standing 
trial for crimes committed in 1994, a misinterpretation of Rwanda’s current security 
status, or a sense that Rwanda is not “home.” Some of these are valid reasons for 
continued refugee status according to international refugee conventions, while others are 
not. 
The Rwandan government has been incredibly proactive in its attempts to 
repatriate Rwandans, both by asking for the authorization and implementation of the 
cessation clauses and by establishing large-scale efforts to promote voluntary return of 
refugees beginning in 2002.68 A sample of recent headlines from Rwanda’s government-
endorsed paper, The New Times, exhibit this eagerness for repatriation and pride in 
genocide recovery: 
 “Rwandans are always welcome home” (16 July 2012) 
 “Implementation of cessation clause vital” (09 October 2011) 
                                                 
67 See Mamdani, When Victims become killers, 103-132,  185-189, 202-206, 254; Cwik, "Forced 
to Flee and Forced to Repatriate,” 735-737; Interviews by author 2011 and 2012; Amnesty 
International, Safer to Stay Silent, 8, 23-24, 33. 
68 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, par. 29. 
                                                                                                                           Rabideau      39 
 “Time to congratulate ourselves, as Rwandans” (02 July 2012) 
 “Rwanda is a peaceful country, all should return.” (15 July 2012) 
 
President Kagame and his government are eager to prove that efforts to reconcile and 
move forward are working. His reliance on foreign aid and investment, and his party’s 
need for other countries to believe that Rwanda is stable and recovered, are negatively 
impacted by the continuing existence of the “Rwandan refugee crisis” and the very 
category and existence of Rwandan refugees living in surrounding countries. 
Nevertheless, the government routinely limits expression, manipulates elections, and 
denies committing crimes against its citizens in western Rwanda and the eastern parts of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.69 
 In October 2009, the UNHCR agreed to implement cessation as part of a 
“comprehensive strategy” addressing the Rwandan refugee crisis and particularly those 
refugees who fled Rwanda before 1999. Under this plan, refugees who left Rwanda in 
1999 or later are not supposed to be subject to cessation. The UN offers a very brief 
justification as to why this date was chosen, stating that “unlike refugee flows from 
Rwanda after 1998, the above-mentioned periods share the character of group or large-
scale forced population movements as a result of armed conflict, events seriously 
disturbing public order and/or the preservation of a consistent pattern of mass violations 
of human rights including genocide.” Before 1999, almost all Rwandans gained refugee 
                                                 
69 See Cwik, "Forced to Flee and Forced to Repatriate,” 740-742; Amnesty International, Safer to 
Stay Silent, 7-9, 13-15, 20, 26; Amnesty International, Memorandum to the Government of 
Uganda about the Cessation of Refugee Protection for Rwandans (London: Amnesty 
International Publications, 2011), 8; Amnesty International, Memorandum to the Government of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo about the Cessation of Refugee Protection for Rwandans, 
(London: Amnesty International Publications, 2011). 7; Fahamu, Rwanda: Cessation of Refugee 
Status is Unwarranted, 7-15, 28-31. 
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status prima facie, on a group—not an individual—basis.70 Interestingly, an explanation 
as to why more recent refugees are excluded from the application of cessation is absent in 
the document. Addressing the refugee-creating conditions that persist in Rwanda would 
challenge the underlying assumption of cessation for pre-1999 refugees: Rwanda is safe 
for refugees to return. 
The cessation plan has several parts, including heightened efforts to push 
voluntary repatriation, plans for local integration or acquisition of non-refugee legal 
status in asylum countries, and creating a clear timetable for the start and end of 
cessation.71 In order to invoke the cessation clauses, the UNHCR and refugee host states 
are obligated to investigate the conditions in the refugee’s country of origin and 
determine that they have changed sufficiently to warrant their safe return. In the 
document announcing its “comprehensive strategy” for Rwanda, the UNHCR argues that 
Rwanda currently enjoys “an essential level of peace and security.” Reconciliation 
efforts, parliamentary and presidential elections, and the signing of several human rights 
treaties are also cited as evidence of fundamental change. The UNHCR admits to 
continuing concerns about “restricted space for political opposition,” but counters that the 
current positive developments outweigh them.72 Efforts to promote voluntary repatriation 
have intensified so that cessation must be completed by 30 June 2013—the latest 
extension of the deadline.73 At that point, all pre-1999 Rwandans who remain abroad and 
                                                 
70 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, par. 27.  
71 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, Section C.   
72 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, par. 28-29. 
73 Initially, Cessation was to take effect at the end of 2011. Later, the date was pushed to the 
middle of 2012, and most recently, to 30 June 2013. The UNHCR cites “the requests of countries 
of asylum for greater flexibility in the implementation of cessation at the national level” as 
justification for the delayed date of implementation. See United Nations. Implementation of the 
Comprehensive Strategy, par. 3.  
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had been considered refugees will become illegal residents of their asylum country and 
subject to attached penalties and restrictions. 
Like the Rwandan government and the UNHCR, many asylum countries are eager 
to ease themselves of the burdens of hosting Rwandan refugees. Countries have been 
slow in creating alternative solutions for refugees not wishing to repatriate despite the 
fact that the cessation clauses and the UNHCR’s “comprehensive strategy” mandate that 
refugees be presented with substitutes for forced repatriation, including exemption based 
on compelling individual circumstances or, in the case of long-term refugees with strong 
community ties, the chance to seek legal residency or citizenship in their country of 
asylum. As of 2011, Uganda had not taken any steps to establish such alternatives, and 
other host states have been slow moving as well.74 Though the UNHCR makes 
recommendations for cessation of refugee status, the decision ultimately rests with 
asylum states, making them important actors in such situations. 
 For some Rwandan refugees, the attention and assistance that the cessation 
clauses attract have created welcome opportunities. The Rwandan government began 
investing in “go-and-see”/”come-and-tell” missions nearly a decade ago, in which small 
groups of refugees from various camps are brought back to Rwanda on brief information 
gathering trips. Once there, they have the opportunity to see and experience the country’s 
current conditions firsthand. After their visit, the refugees return to their asylum countries 
to share these experiences with other refugees. The government also sends teams of 
Rwandans out to the refugee camps to share information and leaflets on the current status 
                                                 
74 See Cwik, "Forced to Flee and Forced to Repatriate,” 738-739; UNHCR, Implementation of the 
Comprehensive Strategy, par. 17, 33-36; Jeremy R. Tarwater, "Analysis and Case Studies of the 
"Ceased Circumstances" Cessation Clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention," Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal 15 (2001): 563-624. 
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of the country, the repatriation process, and what refugees can expect while reintegrating. 
Some, reassured by these efforts, have decided to return voluntarily—over 150,000 
refugees have gone back to Rwanda since these government efforts initially began near 
the end of 2002.75 This positive response has not, however, been universal. When the 
cessation decision was announced in 2009, a number of Rwandan refugees living in 
Uganda attempted to flee the camps to avoid forced repatriation. They still harbor very 
real fears of persecution and imprisonment. Soon after running away, these refugees were 
caught and arrested by the government of Uganda, which gave them into the custody of 
the Rwandan government; their ultimate fate is unknown.76 
~ 
The Rwandan refugee crisis is a complex and intricate situation with deep historical 
roots. The UNHCR and OAU have developed internationally-recognized definitions of 
the term “refugee” and the rights and protections that should accompany the term. 
Ultimately, the responsibility of labeling and protecting asylum seekers rests with 
individual state governments, who must negotiate the political, social, and economic 
pressures of hosting large populations of asylum seekers. The UNHCR cessation clauses 
offer an officially-sanctioned way for countries of asylum to relieve themselves of these 
pressures, forcing unwilling refugees to repatriate. Cessation for Rwandans must be 
completed by the middle of this year. The following two chapters explore the ways in 
which refugee status and impending repatriation shape notions of identity, home, and 
belonging, as well as the conditions in Rwanda that render such a decision premature.  
                                                 
75 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, par.11; Interviews by author 2011, 
2012. 
76 Cwik, "Forced to Flee and Forced to Repatriate,” 737; Interviews by author, 2011, 2012.  
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Chapter 2: “Rwanda, C’est Mon Pays”:
77
 Negotiating Home and 
Belonging 
 
Refugees are neither citizens nor foreigners. They undermine the neat 
compartmentalization of national belongings into a resident “self” and an alien “other,”78 
or the idea that an “international” world of states includes and represents all individuals 
and groups. Refugees’ status is inextricably tied to their exclusion, dispersal, or fear of 
return to a state where they ostensibly belong. They become refugees because they cannot 
be at home in the sovereign state that supposedly affords them citizenship and protection. 
Indeed, they left this national “home” and resist returning for a variety of reasons, 
including danger, fear, and trauma. Their status as refugees, designated and dictated by 
states and the UNHCR, an organization composed of state actors, destabilizes their 
identities and challenges authorized categories of belonging and home, which are largely 
based on the logic of citizenship in sovereign states. 
Identity is malleable, regularly rearticulated and subject to manipulation. 
Categories imposed from the top down—by the United Nations, religious institutions and 
projects, ethnic and racial projects, state legal systems, and dominant discourses and 
practices in a given context—interact with individual and collective feelings that are 
strongly shaped by positionalities, collective and individual histories, and daily 
experiences. Because refugees have been denied connection to one of the strongest 
determinants of legal identity and belonging—the country of citizenship—they are forced 
to continually renegotiate ideas of home and belonging.79 For Rwandan refugees, their 
                                                 
77 “Rwanda is my country.” 
78 See Emma Haddad, "The Refugee: Forging National Identities," Studies in Ethnicity and 
Nationalism 2, no. 2 (2002): 28-30. 
79 Liisa Helena Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, memory, and national cosmology among 
Hutu refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).  
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lives, identities, and sense of belonging are also challenged by the threat of “cessation” of 
their refugee status, which does not necessarily depend on resolution of the reasons for 
their initial or continued dispersal. This legal action does not substantively address each 
of their traumas, desires, fears, or the conditions to which they will be forced to return. 
Rwandans who fled their homeland for very real reasons—discrimination, massacre, 
Genocide, fear, persecution, trauma, and in some cases the search for a less impoverished 
life elsewhere—are now being told that Rwanda should once again be their home, and 
that they must return. They are experiencing a mandatory redefinition of self and identity: 
once excluded, they are now called back; once rejected, they are now forced to belong. 
This chapter explores ideas of home and belonging in the narratives of 
interviewed Rwandans who fled to the Nakivaale Refugee Settlement in Southern 
Uganda and remained in exile, in the narratives of interviewed former refugees who have 
returned to Rwanda, and in state-sponsored discourse in Rwanda. Among the refugees, 
some remain attached to Rwanda as a geographic location, national identity, home, and 
place of belonging. Others reject this notion, insisting that they can never return to 
Rwanda and that they can never again belong there. They feel homeless. Some identify as 
refugees, living in an emotional and legal limbo where they wait for their situations to 
change. Returnees discussed coming back to Rwanda and their attachment to Rwanda as 
home. Government-sponsored discourses insist that Rwanda is new and improved, and 
that all Rwandans should return. Whether or not refugees and returnees accept such 
government claims, these discourses infuse their discussions of home, belonging, and 
return.  
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Understanding the shared identities, if any, of the Rwandan refugees who were 
my interlocutors and interviewees in Nakivaale has been an interesting and challenging 
task. I refer to them as “Rwandan” and “refugee,” often paired: “Rwandan refugee.” But 
these are labels of referential convenience rather than clear categories of social 
belonging. Though at one time each of these men and women lived in Rwanda, and 
though they now live in Nakivaale, these facts indicate no more than past and present 
geographic locations. Their actual identities are much more tangled. Many are homeless, 
rootless, wanderers. Others pine for return to a place they still remember as home. None 
“belong” in the settlement. Ultimately, the refugees are not free to determine where they 
want to belong or where they would like to call home. The Rwandan government, the 
governments of asylum countries, and international organizations such as the UNHCR 
are the dominant actors in the Rwandan refugee crisis. They decide in broad policy and 
legal strokes how to categorize Rwandans, what resources and protections they may 
receive, and where they should live. 
Complicating Home, Belonging, and Return 
 
Imana yiriwa ahandi igataha I Rwanda. 
God spends the day elsewhere, but He sleeps in Rwanda.80 
 
It is said by Rwandans that the great beauty of their country, the land of a 
thousand hills, draws God there each night. No matter where he has wandered or what he 
has done, he comes back “home” to sleep at the end of every day. During my time in 
Rwanda and Uganda—the fall months of 2011 and the summer of 2012—I found 
Rwandans to be extraordinarily proud of the country as a physical space. Often, strangers 
                                                 
80 This is an old, common Rwandan saying occasionally heard with slight variations. This 
particular wording and translation were taken from the epigraph of Joseph Sebarenzi, God Sleeps 
in Rwanda: A Journey of Transformation (New York: Atria Books, 2009).  
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would approach me in the street to ask, “What do you think of Rwanda? Is it not 
beautiful, our land of a thousand hills?” I always agreed—both the land and the people 
are full of beauty. For many of those living in Rwanda, the lush, rolling green hills, 
beautiful lakes, winding rivers, and the new, clean roads of the capital city make it a 
space to which they are uniquely connected. They see the land of Rwanda and the people 
of Rwanda as nearly one and the same. Not surprisingly, the relationships and 
connections to the land of Rwanda are more complicated for those who left the country 
and remain outside. 
The Rwandan government is adamant that Rwanda, as both a state and a 
geographic location, continues to represent “home” for its refugees. No matter the time or 
the reason for leaving Rwanda, the government often describes those who have fled as 
“lost” or “wandering.” In President Kagame’s words, the return to Rwanda of all those 
who have left is the only conceivable solution to the country’s ongoing refugee crisis. 
Speaking to a delegation of Rwandans—former refugees who had just returned from 
exile in Zambia—General Marcel Gatsinzi, head of the country’s Ministry of Disaster 
Management and Refugee Affairs, proclaimed, “there is no better place than home,”81 
leaving unstated that home is more than the legal definition of citizenship or origin. 
Indeed, in a government-published pamphlet that was widely distributed throughout the 
refugee camps, immediate repatriation appears to be the only option the government has 
presented to its refugees. The brochure, published in Kinyarwanda, French, and English, 
is organized in question-and-answer form and divided into two sections. The first 
provides basic information about the UNHCR cessation clauses. The second, titled 
                                                 
81 Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs, "Returnees and Diaspora from Zambia 
extol the country development," December 18, 2012. 
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“Practical Information for Rwandese Refugees,” consists of thirteen questions, including 
“Once we reach Rwanda, will we have to stay in a camp?” and “Can our children enroll 
in schools immediately?” All of these questions assume repatriation is a certainty, not one 
of several options.82  From the government’s perspective, if Rwanda as a geographic 
entity and state of citizenship is refugees’ home, return is the only option. 
Two returned refugees, Patrick and Pascal, shared their stories with me. Their 
families fled Rwanda during massacres against the Tutsi in 1959 and 1973, respectively. 
Despite living in exile for several decades, both felt strongly that they belonged in 
Rwanda, and their absences were marked by a great desire to come “home.” Pascal was a 
young man when his family left Rwanda. He first sought asylum in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. During the two decades his family spent outside Rwanda, he felt 
they never had a home. They simply wandered, his parents keeping alive their children’s 
connection to the country by speaking often of its history and of their desire to return. He 
likens his situation to that of President Kagame, who was also a refugee, and now, as the 
country’s leader, is arguably the most “Rwandan” of Rwandans.83  
                                                 
82 See Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs, "Questions and Answers about the 
Invocation of the Cessation Clause" (Kigali: Blue Star House, September 2011). 
83 Paul Kagame was born in Gitarama, Rwanda in 1959. In 1961, he and his family, Tutsis, were 
forced to flee Rwanda for fear of the violent, ethnically-driven massacres taking place at the time. 
They lived in exile in Uganda, where Kagame grew up and attended school. He returned briefly 
to Rwanda in 1977 and 1978, traveling the country from Kigali to visit friends and relatives who 
had either already returned or had never left. When political conditions in Uganda began to 
deteriorate, Kagame joined the army of Joseph Museveni (who would later become the president 
of Uganda) as an intelligence officer and information gatherer. This position offered him and his 
family a measure of control and protection. Using the power, influence, and networks he gained 
in this post, Kagame organized the community of Rwandan exiles that would later be the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front, invading Rwanda from the north, and arguably ending the Genocide. 
See Colin M. Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide, and the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 2004), 7-10, 16-19, 24-26, 29-33, 
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 Patrick also spoke of his family’s connection to Rwanda as home. He was born 
outside the country, when his family was living as refugees in the DRC, and grew up in 
Uganda. His family’s period of refugeehood was one of homeless transitions and waiting. 
He explains, “For a long time my family had no home. You can live some place and it is 
not your home because you plan to leave, as soon as it is possible.” His recollections 
differ from his practices, though, in that as much as he claims Rwanda as his country, he 
belongs and has social and emotional attachments to Uganda and to people in Uganda as 
well. This is not surprising—Patrick spent roughly half his life in Uganda. He continues 
to travel there frequently for work or to visit family and friends. But ethnic and national 
discourses, state citizenship rules, and UNHCR requirements misrecognize such dual and 
contingent sentiments and certainly discourage them as complicating state discourses, 
rules, and requirements. 
The notion of home as a “fixed, bounded, and enclosed site” fits neatly within the 
view that identity is largely a product of national belonging, and that the state has 
geographic boundaries that parallel one’s sense of home.84 Some of the Rwandan 
refugees I spoke with retained an incredibly strong sense of Rwanda as both their country 
and their home. Among the most vocal proponents of this idea were Clément, a priest, 
and Jean-Pierre, a former schoolteacher. Educated men, outspoken and bold, they 
lamented the circumstances that forced them to flee Rwanda. They emphasized that 
leaving Rwanda was not a choice, but a necessity they wished to someday reverse. 
Though they left Rwanda nearly a decade apart, they told similar stories: they were 
working to bring to light stories of RPF violence. They hoped that recognition of these 
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crimes could lead to peace and justice for those still dissatisfied and living as refugees. 
Kagame’s government, in an effort to silence their accounts, threatened their lives. Yet 
for these two, Rwanda is nevertheless their country and their place of belonging. Jean-
Pierre insists, “Rwanda, c’est mon pays” (“Rwanda is my country”), and always marks 
references to his country of birth with the possessive pronoun “mon.” Clément has a 
similar sense of “Rwandanness,” stating that “nous sommes tous Rwandais” (“we are all 
Rwandan”). Like Jean-Pierre, Clément uses possessive pronouns, referring to Rwanda 
and Rwandans as “mon pays, mes peuple” (“my country, my people”). Rwanda is not just 
a country, its people not a people; Rwandans are his, and he speaks of them in a way that 
shows that he is a part of them and he belongs there. By using these qualifiers, Jean-
Pierre and Clément personally claim Rwandan belonging despite being refugees. 
Clément believes that all Rwandans should be working towards a return, and his 
conviction is evident when he talks about cessation. He says, “ils peuvent rentrer chez 
eux et commencer à vivre encore” (“they can go back home and begin to live again”), 
emphasizing the needs of refugees who fled because of the1994 Genocide, civil war, and 
massacres that pre-dated these events. He implicitly differentiates these refugee cohorts 
from more recent refugees, many of whose flight he believes is motivated by political 
disagreements rather than violence and is therefore less legitimate. Their motivations, he 
believes, stem from psychological fear and are not related to real potential for injury or 
death. The sources of their flight are often less tangible because the violences of 
Genocide and civil war in 1994 and the following years have mostly ceased. Despite 
these changes, the government continues to restrict space for political opposition, and 
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dissenters are frequently detained, tortured, or killed in secret.85  In Clément’s statement, 
“they” are the early refugees, the ones who left before the 1994 Genocide and the start of 
Kagame’s reign. He sees Rwanda as both their home and his, where return would provide 
a fresh start and a new beginning. Rwanda is the one place where he imagines that their 
lives can be full, good, and meaningful. Though some Rwandans have lived in the 
settlement for half a century, in Clément’s reading, it can never be their home. 
Thérèse, a highly educated refugee—she worked in IT until she fled the country 
in 2010—also referred to Rwanda as “home,” but one that is ultimately unattainable. She 
spoke regretfully of her husband, arrested for “speaking against the wishes of his 
excellency our president,” which drove her and her family into exile. She talked of the 
country’s “secret security” and the constant fear that plagues so many Rwandans’ lives. 
But even as she spoke against him and refused to envision a return to Rwanda, she, like 
the men above, called Kagame “our president” and considered herself Rwandan, 
certainly, given her long attachments to Rwanda as home and her recent move. 
The Rwandan government emphasizes the importance and necessity of 
repatriation—of coming home and going home—by citing the change and progress that 
has taken place in the country since the 1994 Genocide. This is a widely propagated 
narrative, produced by a significant public relations machinery86: that Rwanda is home 
for all its refugees, the one place they belong, the root of their identity. MIDIMAR, the 
                                                 
85 See Amnesty International, Rwanda—Shrouded in Secrecy: Illegal Detention and Torture by 
Military Intelligence, (London: Amnesty International, Ltd., 2012), 7-8, 11, 17-21; Amnesty 
International, Safer to Stay Silent, 7-9, 11, 20-22, 27; Chi Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps: 
Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda," Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 18 (2005): 206-207. 
86 In order to build and maintain a public image of a progressive country recovered from the 
Genocide, President Kagame has employed several public relations firms. These include the UK-
based consulting group BTP advisors (http://www.btpadvisers.com/) and the global public 
relations agency Racepoint Group (http://www.racepointgroup.com/). 
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Rwandan Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee affairs, highlights the return and 
reintegration process in short articles and testimonials from returnees. One woman, 
Clementine, who fled Rwanda during the 1994 Genocide and lived in the DRC and South 
Africa as a refugee until she returned in January of 2013, is quoted as saying: “Returning 
home is the best gift the government has ever offered me.” The article goes on to say how 
thankful she is to have returned, and how “safe” and “at home” she feels after nineteen 
years away.87 Another MIDIMAR article tells how Antoine Ruvebana, the ministry’s 
Permanent Secretary, “congratulated them [a group of returned refugees] for their wise 
decision to choose home after many years they have spent in the miserable life.”88 In 
these narratives, Rwanda—the physical, geographic location—is inescapably and 
permanently home for all Rwandans, refugee or otherwise. 
The Rwandan government relies heavily on its post-Genocide newspaper, The 
New Times,89 to publish similar articles. The paper regularly spotlights returned refugees 
who have successfully reintegrated into Rwandan society, praising those who have 
returned “home” or to “the motherland” as “great,” or “of great thoughts.”90 Like the 
MIDIMAR official who calls returnees “wise,” these articles reflect the government idea 
that returning home—at least for upstanding citizens—is a practical, logical choice. 
                                                 
87 Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs, "'Returning home is the best gift the 
gov't has ever offered me' Mujawimana Clementine," January 22, 2013. 
88 Ministry of Disaster and Refugee Affairs, "Over 300 Rwandan refugees repatriate in one 
week," January 9, 2013. 
89 Though The New Times is technically a privately-owned newspaper, several scholars and 
human-rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, claim that the newspaper is state-
run and that the government tangibly influences its publications. See Marie-Soleil Frère, "After 
the Hate Media: Regulation in the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda," Global Media and 
Communications 5, no. 3 (2009): 347; Georgette Gagnon, Response to The New Times Article on 
Rwandan Genocide (Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
90 See Eric Kabeera, "Family returns after 37 years in exile," The New Times, July 12, 2012; 
Charles Rurangwa, "Rwanda is a peaceful country, all should return," The New Times, July 14, 
2012. 
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Choosing to return, repatriating before the force of cessation comes into full effect, is a 
decision of the enlightened that should be emulated. Those who haven’t come back, 
especially refugees in the DRC, are often portrayed as criminals, guilty genocidaires, or 
members of fighting groups such as the FDLR.91 
It is difficult to imagine that refugee families who have not stepped foot in 
Rwanda for several decades could still be attached to Rwanda—Rwanda as it is today, 
and not just a memory of Rwanda. David Newbury presents this issue as a problem of 
discontinuity between a remembered Rwanda and the country as it currently exists. 
Refugees, he says, often assume they will be returning to a place that remains as they left 
it. Change over time, especially over the decades so many Rwandans have spent in exile, 
is inevitable. Those who believe that their former country has not changed may believe in 
or remember a home or a space that no longer exists, an idea of times past that has worn 
away. They have no home to return to—it has changed and they have changed.92 If 
anything, they must rebuild a sense of home. 
 Both Patrick and Pascal, the returnees, describe contemporary Rwanda using the 
same government rhetoric and buzzwords that were ubiquitous in the capital: Rwanda is 
“advanced,” “developed,” and a “model for Africa.” Such language, which is widely 
propagated by the state, stresses the ruling government’s leadership and changes: 
                                                 
91 See Eric Kabeera, "100 refugees return home from Congo," The New Times, January 09, 2013. 
The FDLR, or Forces Démocratique de Libération du Rwanda—Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda—is a rebel group located in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Its fighters mostly consist of former members or advocates of the Hutu Power movement, who 
fled the country after the RPF ended the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. It is widely believed that 
most in the FDLR are guilty of crimes of genocide. See Jason Stearns, "FDLR Continues to Pose 
a Threat to DRC and Rwandan Stability," Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 32, no. 
11/12 (2004): 22-24. 
92 David Newbury, "Returning Refugees: Four Historical Patterns of "Coming Home" to 
Rwanda," Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History, 2005: 253. 
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• A Vision2020 report, a plan describing Rwanda’s national development goals, 
proclaims, “Rwanda has made significant progress from the devastated nation that 
emerged from the 1994 Genocide.”93 In a related promotional video, posted from 
the government’s Vision2020 YouTube account, a woman farmer expresses a 
similar view, saying, “we used to be primitive and did not know any better. But 
after government intervention, we woke up and became productive.” The 
promotional film shows shots of Rwandan schools, businesses, and farms, all 
filled with hardworking Rwandans eager to show off their progress and success.94 
• All over Kigali, the government has posted giant purple and white billboards that 
read: “Twigire ku mateka twubaka ejo hazaza” or “Learning from history to build 
a brighter tomorrow.” The signs are in purple and white, Rwanda’s colors of 
mourning and genocide commemoration. Next to these words, a declaration reads 
“18 years!” besides a small flame silhouette—the logo of the government’s anti-
genocide body (Figure 1). 
• The New Times routinely calls Rwanda a “model for Africa”95 and “an inspiration 
to other countries,”96 and proclaims, “we are making progress.”97 
                                                 
93 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Rwanda Vision 2020 (Kigali: Government of 
Rwanda, 2000), 4.  
94 The Republic of Rwanda, "Rwanda Vision 2020 - Transforming Lives," YouTube, February 9, 
2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GPJiT1-Yo3w (accessed February 8, 2013). 
95 See Edwin Musoni, "Rwanda is model for Africa - WB boss," The New Times, November 4, 
2010; The New Times, "Kagame receives Global Peace Award," October 27, 2010; Paul Kagame, 
"Rwanda's democracy is still the model for Africa," The New Times, August 21, 2010; and Grace 
Kwinjeh, "Rwanda - A new model for Africa's development," The New Times, September 11, 
2009. 
96 The New Times, "Kagame receives Global Peace Award.” 
97 Kagame, "Rwanda's democracy.” Note that this article was actually written by Paul Kagame, 
President of Rwanda, following his reelection to a second seven-year term. 
                                                                                                                           Rabideau      54 
• On a page outlining the history of Rwanda, the government’s website states that 
“the country has made unprecedented socio-economic and political progress” 
under Kagame’s leadership. The section does not cite any particular points of 
evidence or accomplishment, instead describing the president’s “landslide” 
election victories and calling his platform one of “rapid development for the 
transformation of the lives of all Rwandans.”98 
These represent just a few examples of government discourse on Rwanda’s progress and 
development. Though the recovery of Rwanda’s infrastructure, especially in Kigali, has 
been impressive, the deeper, more meaningful process of reconciliation lags behind.  
Figure 1: Billboard Commemorating the 18
th
 Anniversary of Genocide 
 
This billboard, and others like it 
were omnipresent in Kigali 
during the 18th anniversary 
commemoration period of the 
1994 Genocide. The posters 
were published by the 
government’s National 
Commission for the Fight 
Against Genocide, or CNLG. 
 
Source: 
www.cnlg.gov.rw 
 Patrick and Pascal do not address the superficial, forced nature of Rwanda’s post-
Genocide transformations. While the country may have changed in many significant, 
tangible ways—infrastructure development, progressive health and education 
                                                 
98 The Republic of Rwanda, Brief History of Rwanda, 2012, http://www.gov.rw/History (accessed 
January 28, 2013). 
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programming99—some aspects of recovery remain woefully neglected. There are many 
problems, simplifications, and elisions in the dominant framing of the problems and 
solutions. Patrick and Pascal share these hegemonic stories of a strong and recovered 
country. They seem attached to the Rwanda of today. For them, it may be the safest 
course to repeat the ruling party’s rhetoric of recovery and progress, rather than risk 
upsetting a precarious and powerful government by speaking freely. They continue to 
imagine and create their idea of home just as they did during their refugeehood, when 
they were distanced from it and it remained simply an elusive idea. 
Being and Feeling Homeless 
The word “refugee” is rooted in the idea of refuge, a place of shelter or protection. 
Before World War I, the concept was more focused on the receiving or asylum end of the 
refugee experience. A “refugee” was a person seeking safe haven. After the war, the 
definition shifted to focus on flight, not destination, as the main component of refugee 
identity. Today, to be a refugee is to drift or flee across international boundaries.100 When 
the United Nations began the challenging task of defining and outlining the components 
of refugee identity in 1951, they were confronted with a large, preexisting refugee crisis 
that spanned Europe. Their definition had to encompass first the Jews, persecuted under 
Nazi Germany, and then the thousands in Eastern Europe fleeing repressive communist 
regimes. Generally, these first refugees were members of well-defined groups, and they 
had been harmed or had been threatened harm on the basis of personal characteristics—
                                                 
99 These changes are discussed more fully in Chapter 3.  
100 Douglas Harper, Refugee, 2012, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=refugee 
(accessed February 11, 2013). 
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race, religion, nationality, political opinion—or social class.101 As discussed more fully in 
Chapter 1, the 1951 UNHCR definition has expanded over time and continues to be used 
internationally today. According to the 1951 UNHCR definition, a refugee is someone 
forced to leave the international boundary or boundaries of their country of citizenship by 
either state persecution or fear of it.102  
 Many of the refugees I spoke did not share the points of view of returnees Patrick 
and Pascal that they are unquestionably Rwandan. They did not, like refugees Jean-Pierre 
or Clément, believe that going home could or should be a goal. Instead, some lay claim to 
their collective refugee status as a source of identity and belonging. They are home, or at 
least they are homeless, which is in itself a kind of “home” for some refugees. For a few 
Rwandans, their status as wanderers had religious connotations. Religion—Christianity in 
particular—has a longstanding important role in Rwanda. The country is over ninety 
percent Christian, with the majority practicing Roman Catholicism.103 Although some 
Church officials were instrumental in genocidal planning and preparation, and many 
churches were sites of massacre during Genocide,104 religion is still a dominant, moving 
                                                 
101 Daniel J. Steinbock, "Interpreting the Refugee Definition," UCLA Law Review, 1998: 735-736, 
768, 788; William Thomas Worster, "The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary 
International Law," Berkeley Journal of International Law 30, no. 1 (2012): 105-107.  
102 The text of the UNHCR definition calls a refugee any person who, “as a result of events 
occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it.” This definition is found in the UNHCR Convention, Article I, A 
(ii) and is discussed and analyzed in Chapter 1.  
103 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Rwanda: International Religious Freedom 
Report 2007 (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, 2007). 
104 See Timothy Longman, "Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda," Journal of Religion in 
Africa 31, no. 2 (2001): 163, 165-166, 181-182; Timothy Longman and Théoneste Rutagengwa, 
"Religion, Memory, and Violence in Rwanda," in Religion, Violence, Memory, and Place, 132-
146 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).  
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forces in the lives of the refugees I spoke to in Nakivaale. Several compared their 
refugeehood to the archetypal experiences of Jesus. They spoke of Jesus’ flight with his 
family into Egypt, and of his time wandering in the desert. Rosine told me, while 
motioning to a painting of the crucifix—the only ornamentation on otherwise bare 
walls—that being a refugee was tolerable because Jesus had been one, too: “I am a 
refugee. You can see. It is not so bad. The son of God, our lord Jesus Christ, was once a 
refugee.” In another conversation, Emmanuel suggested the same: “This problem, this 
reason why I am here in Uganda… do you know Jesus was also a refugee?” 
Likening their refugee identity to that of their prophet—a man looked to as the 
epitome of what they should strive to be—brings these refugees a kind of hope or 
comfort they need to go on. The status of being a refugee or a wanderer, belonging as a 
refugee or with other refugees, does not solve the material or citizenship problems of 
these Rwandans. Instead, it is a way of negotiating the fear, insecurity, or shame that such 
status brings,105 a method of reclaiming some of the agency, dignity, and self-
determination lost in exile. There is a certain sense of pride in having lived through the 
tragedy and hardships of refugeehood, and in this respect, identifying as a refugee is a 
way of expressing perseverance against odds and giving meaning to suffering.106  
 Though Nakivaale, as a space of exile, has not necessarily or fully become a home 
for all its inhabitants, it still may serve as a place of refugee belonging. Some migration-
influenced theories of identity and belonging describe home as a network of relationships 
that are not dependent on locale or on a single location. Home, in this sense, is mobile, 
                                                 
105 See Awa M. Abdi, "In Limbo: Dependency, Insecurity, and Identity among Somali Refugees 
in Dadaab Camps," Refuge 22, no. 2 (2005): 6-14 for a discussion of this shame in the Somali 
context. 
106 Maggie O'Neill and Tony Spybey, "Global Refugees, Exile, Displacement and Belonging," 
Sociology 37, no. 1 (2003): 8. 
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and changes according to experiences of social inclusion or exclusion and processes of 
perception and creation of “self” and “other.” Notions of belonging depend on refugees’ 
ability to participate in group societal practices as well as their more subjective feelings 
of being included. The identities that develop from this reading of home are layered, 
multiple, and occasionally contradictory.107 
 One refugee, Rosine, gave me some indication that while the Nakivaale refugee 
camp might not be home to her, it has produced a kind of a community. The other 
refugees, though not her family, understand her as a survivor and together they’ve 
developed a kind of mutual reliance, taking care of the sick, poor, and hungry. For 
Rosine, “home” has become not a location nor an idea, nor a recovery of the past, but a 
community. The camp is not her home, but the people who live there are. She no longer 
accepts that Rwanda—physical, geographic, spatial, national Rwanda—is her home. 
Other refugees, even if they still hold out hope for successful reintegration into Rwanda, 
seem to believe the same. When they spoke of home, Grace and Élise said nothing to 
suggest that they were bonded to the geographic location of Rwanda. Both spoke of home 
as a place or time in their lives where they were happy and successful, where they could 
live and work with their families. 
 Other refugees I spoke with, Rwandans who still harbor a desire to go back, 
rejected this idea of a community within the camp. Jean-Pierre, the schoolteacher, insists 
that the refugees are too different to form such a cohesive, mutually dependent group:  
“Nous sommes très différents. Je peux passer le temps avec quelques-uns, mais les 
autres… nous sommes pas le même.” (“We are very different. I can spend time with some 
of them, but the others… we are not the same.”) Jean-Pierre harbors an intense desire to 
                                                 
107 For a detailed discussion of this idea, see Ralph and Staeheli, "Home and Migration.” 
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return to Rwanda. Perhaps those only who completely reject the possibility of return can 
find a sense of home among the homeless.  
To me, these ideas of home as a positive, safe space, seem more like a memory of 
experience and relations than descriptions of a geographically- or politically-defined 
space. Home is a feeling more than a location. It is the relationships in a country, village, 
or home more than it is the place itself. Newbury’s research touches on this idea of the 
relationship-oriented renegotiations of home and identity. He discusses how changes in 
the refugee, in their country of origin, and in the relationships and connections they have 
forged while away can reshape refugees’ sense of home in the way that changes in 
physical and social have a similar impact. When cessation comes into full effect, 
Rwandan refugees, especially those who fled before or during the 1994 Genocide, will be 
returning to a fundamentally different country than the one they left: a new political 
system, rebuilt infrastructure, a state ostensibly seeking to reject the Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnicities that were once defining in favor of a new idea of homogenous national unity. 
Return involves re-involvement in a changed community, not necessarily the “correction” 
of a physical displacement.108 Home, then, is both the sensation of belonging and the 
strength of relationships. For these refugees, home is a mobile idea that is not well-
captured in arbitrary entities such as the nation or the state. 
 For Rwandan refugees, identity, identification, and feelings of belonging and 
home are more than usually complex. Different refugees emphasize different parts of 
their lives, connections, and experiences when negotiating their ideas of home. For some, 
both returnees and refugees, Rwanda as a physical space and a political entity continues 
to serve as the primary marker of their identity. Others feel as if they no longer belong to 
                                                 
108 Newbury, "Returning Refugees,” 253-255, 277-281. 
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the country because of the pain, injustice, or fear they experienced there. Though life in 
Nakivaale, the refugee settlement, does not lend itself to the kind of home creation they 
are searching for, for a few it has served as an opportunity to form a new community. 
They attempt to separate home and belonging from the physical space of Rwanda and 
instead identify through relationships, shared experiences, and mutual dependencies. 
An Emotional and Legal Limbo of Waiting 
 Many refugees in Nakivaale live in limbo, waiting for the time they are able to 
return to Rwanda, which for some remains country and home. Life as a refugee is 
temporary by definition. The uncertain possibility of return can paralyze refugees, 
interfering with their ability to make basic life decisions, to plan for their futures, or to act 
on any potentialities. Their refugee status can cause them to see their life as one of 
restricted possibilities. Even if they spend decades living as refugees, the suspended and 
unpredictable nature of their lives limits opportunities to the short-term since life can 
change direction at a moment’s notice. The social and psychological consequences of this 
forced suspense and life on the periphery can be severe: aggravating mental illnesses 
such as post-traumatic stress disorder, intensifying poverty, and making it difficult to 
constitute or sustain families. Prolonged refugee status and the uncertainty surrounding 
its cessation forces refugees to depend heavily on the hand-to-mouth living arrangements 
of the settlement and dissuades them from seeking self-sufficiency or reliance, if they 
have such a choice. Refugees are forced to live lives suspended before the unknown.109 
                                                 
109 Among the refugees I interviewed in Nakivaale, some seemed to have found a shaky path to 
self-sufficiency or permanence—sharecropping jobs, small-scale craft trading when granted day 
passes to Kampala, teaching or preaching in the camp for a trivial remuneration—while the 
majority remained completely dependent on the settlement’s services and rations for their 
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Marcel, who works as a sharecropper on a farm outside the settlement, described this 
state of limbo as like running in place: “La vie est difficile. On ne travaille pas pour 
améliorer, ou pour quitter—on travaille seulement pour exister.” (“Life is hard. We are 
not working to make things better, or to leave—we are only working to survive.”) He felt 
like he wasn’t moving anywhere, that he wasn’t making any progress, and that his life 
had come to a kind of standstill. 
 Grace, a middle-aged woman from the Rwandan town Gitarama who fled during 
the 1994 Genocide, also attested to this state of suspense: “I am waiting for my country 
that is not my country. I am waiting for my home.” Another woman, Élise, a former 
entrepreneur, explained several times the transitory nature of her homelessness. Despite 
the severity and brutality of the abuse she faced from the Rwandan government, she still 
insists, “Rwanda was my country, my home, and I hope that someday it will be my home 
again. Until then I have none.” Because they have built their lives around the hope that 
their stays in Nakivaale will end, they live in a suspended state of uncertainty that can be 
crippling. As she waits for a return, or for a home, Grace is reluctant to go through the 
motions that would build a more permanent kind of life—finding a job, schools for her 
children, or a more reliable source of food. According to the men and women I spoke 
with, opportunities for these actions are only occasionally offered to Nakivaale refugees. 
This state of uncertainty and suspense is legal and political as well as emotional. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, Rwandan refugee status can be revoked even if the conditions for 
safe return or just resolution are not in place. The threat of “cessation” makes it extremely 
difficult for refugees to develop a sense of home or belonging in their country of refuge. 
                                                 
limbo: Temporary Protected Status and immigrant identities," Global Networks 2, no. 4 (2002): 
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At any time, and through no action or fault of their own, they can lose the legal protection 
and benefits of refugee status and be forced to repatriate, whether or not conditions for 
such repatriation are safe or hospitable. 
 Clément, the priest, wasn’t sure if cessation would affect him. Jean-Pierre, the 
former high-school teacher who spoke with such conviction and insight about his home, 
his country, in Rwanda, was at a loss for words when I asked what he would do if he was 
forced to return. Others—Emmanuel, Rosine, Grace, Élise, Thérèse—spoke of their fears 
and uncertainties surrounding return to Rwanda. For those refugees who refuse even the 
thought of a possible future return to Rwanda, entertaining the idea of the country as 
home seems near impossible. Many insist, in no uncertain terms, that it would be 
inconceivable that they ever go back voluntarily. For Didier, a father who fled with his 
family during Genocide, forced return is unjust and unfair. When I questioned him about 
cessation, he sputtered angrily at me,  
They want to force me back! How can they do this? If I was white like you, if I 
was American like you, they would be [seen as] breaking the law. This is illegal. 
But somehow these laws are different for me, and no one cares. 
 
They—the government, a powerful Rwanda in the abstract, the United Nations, and 
Uganda, his country of refuge—are unjustly forcing him to return to a place where he 
continues to be unsafe. In his eyes, it’s because these actors see his life as insignificant 
and disposable. If it were me—white, American, and so “significant” in the world by 
birthright—he believes that someone, somewhere, would stop it. But either way, it is not 
something that he can control. He is powerless to face the decisions and cruelties of 
governments and the UNHCR. And the fact that “no one cares” makes him feel 
worthless, helpless, and fearful.  
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Marcel and Élise stated explicitly that return, for them, could mean death: “It is 
most possible that they [the government] will kill me” (Élise). Thérèse, the IT specialist, 
agreed. She even went a step further, telling me that death was preferable to return. Her 
insistence on this surprised me, reflecting a hopelessness I couldn’t sense as she talked 
passionately about other things—the pride she takes in her children, her love for them, 
her complaints against Nakivaale’s education system and the secretive nature of the 
Rwandan government. She was opinionated and animated about these subjects. But 
mention of forced return to Rwanda brought out a kind of defeat and bitterness, coupled 
with desperation: “If they make me go back I will die first. I will hang myself before I go 
back to Rwanda. Both ways I will die, but only one way I am killed.” She is willing and 
prepared to take her own life rather than going back to the country that she fled in fear 
and anger. Rwanda is not her home, and she has no hope that it ever will be again. 
 Similarly, Rosine, today a thin, tired, old woman, watched as her children, 
husband, parents, and neighbors were murdered in front of her. She firmly rejected any 
notion that the place where her family was slaughtered could ever again be a place where 
she belonged: 
The government says I must go back. But my husband was killed. My children—
my sons and daughters—they were killed. My parents were killed, and my 
friends, and my neighbors. Everyone I knew is now dead. Why should I go back? 
What would I go back for? If I was there I would think of them, of all those 
people I love who I saw killed. I still hear them dying—now, as I’m talking to 
you, I hear them. I cannot go back to Rwanda. That country is no longer my 
home. 
 
For Rosine, home is strongly connected to her family members and relationships. 
Because her family is gone, so is her home. Rwanda is not her country because it was 
there that she witnessed unspeakable tragedy, a violence that destroyed her loved ones. 
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What was once her “home” has become instead the place that produced her tragedy and 
trauma, the source of violence and death. To Rosine, relationships matter more than 
nationality or place in determining where she will call home.  
 Emmanuel, another refugee who lost his family in Genocide, also rejected any 
possibility that someday he might be able to or want to return to Rwanda. There is 
nothing left for him there. He first left Rwanda in 1994 after his family was killed and 
escaped to Tanzania. Three years later, he returned to his village in Rwanda to find all 
who had lived there before Genocide dead. He spent the next three years living in fear—
of the current government, reprisal killings, and those who had murdered his family 
coming back to finish him off—until he fled a second time, this time to Nakivaale in 
Uganda. He has seen post-Genocide Rwanda, he knows what it has to offer him, but he is 
still afraid and his community is gone. Both Rosine and Emmanuel are homeless and 
country-less. They have no legal category of belonging—citizenship—they are willing to 
occupy.  A return to Rwanda is inconceivable because the things that once made it their 
home—family, safety, peace, security—have been irreparably lost or damaged. 
 Conversely, as much and as fervently as Godfred, the Deputy Camp Commander 
of Nakivaale, insisted that “the settlement, when you are a refugee, is your home,” this 
was not a sentiment shared by any of the refugees with whom I spoke. Even for Didier, 
Marcel, Élise, and Thérèse, who insisted so vehemently that they could never return to 
Rwanda, the camp was not a home nor someplace they truly belonged. Life in Nakivaale 
is a struggle, every day. Most Rwandans live together in one section of the settlement. 
When they first arrive, settlement officials give each family a set of building materials, 
and they construct their own homes. The houses are small, and grouped in tight clusters 
                                                                                                                           Rabideau      65 
off the main, wide, red-dirt road. Many of their roofs are made from corrugated metal, 
pieces of the large containers used for shipping food to the settlement. On some, you can 
still make out the “WFP”—for World Food Programme—painted in big white letters. 
Most of the refugees pass their days outside these “houses,” at work, at school, or 
gossiping in the shade. Groups gathered outside a house if I was there interviewing. At 
night, some refugees sleep on foam mattresses on the floor, and others sleep on the 
ground. There are several communal pipes for water. Food rations are distributed at the 
beginning of each month from a tent near the center of the settlement, except when they 
are late—which is often, according to these refugees. Their lives as refugees are restricted 
and precarious, offering little in the way of safety or comfort. 
 Several of the refugees that I met worried about the way Nakivaale was forcing 
their families to fight to survive. Grace talked about her children’s hunger and poor 
nutrition: “They don’t give us enough food. Look at my boys! If we were in Rwanda they 
would already be big men, but here we have nothing. They are sick often.” Didier, also a 
concerned parent, talked of the shame of being a farmer with no land. Embarrassed that 
he could not properly provide for his family, he told me, “This is where I live now. My 
house is small, my children are hungry. Of course I want to leave. But you tell me—
where should I go?” His life in the camp is neither comfortable nor stable. He does not 
have enough to sustain his family. Nakivaale can never be Didier’s home. 
~ 
 
Refugees negotiate home and belonging in varied and complex ways. While some 
are eager to return to Rwanda even if they are afraid, others cannot imagine ever 
returning, even if conditions are safe. All the refugees live with the possibility of being 
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forced to return to Rwanda—changed or not. The governments in host countries and the 
UNHCR will determine when and if their refugee status will cease. The Rwandan 
government uses massive public relations campaigns to insist that change and progress 
have occurred in Rwanda under the rule of the RPF, and all refugees should return. The 
ruling party depicts the country as transformed and reformed under its rule and as having 
made a near-full recovery from the devastation and trauma of the 1994 Genocide. As 
discussed in the following chapter, the government actively works to compel refugees to 
return through a range of means, including violence, and represses dissent and 
opposition. The RPF uses re-education camps to produce the kind of citizen-subjects it 
perceives to be appropriate to the new Rwanda. The contrasting definitions of home and 
belonging in this chapter raise several interesting questions: Is home (national, family, or 
community) by definition safe? Can one legally or socially belong and yet not feel they 
are home? Are attachments to multiple homes possible? What does it mean for a refugee 
to permanently disavow the home of their “natural” origins? And, can one be “home” in a 
place one is planning to leave? 
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Chapter 3: “Nous Avons Peur de la Vérité”:
110
 Truth, Lies, and Return 
 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) protocols, 
the “ceased circumstances” cessation clauses111 can only be invoked if a refugee’s 
country of origin has undergone both “fundamental” and “durable” changes.  The 
UNHCR and refugee asylum countries state that they attempt to look objectively at the 
situation in the refugee’s country of origin when deciding whether or not the application 
of these “ceased circumstances” cessation clauses is warranted. According to the 
UNHCR, the country of refugees’ origin must have removed “the basis of the fear of 
persecution” for refugees. Change in such a country must be “major, profound or 
substantial” as well as “durable.”112 Before the October 2009 UNHCR recommendation 
that asylum countries apply the cessation clauses to Rwandan refugees living in their 
countries, the UNHCR conducted an investigation into Rwanda’s current political 
situation and the changes enacted in the years since the 1994 Genocide in response to the 
continued requests of the Rwandan government.113 
Rwandan efforts to project to the UNHCR, other governments, international 
economic organizations, and funders that the country has improved and changed since the 
1994 Genocide have been largely successful. The UNHCR recognized that Rwanda has 
undergone “positive developments” and “rapid, fundamental and crucially positive 
change,” citing as evidence the establishment of a new constitution and government, the 
development of a National Human Rights Commission, the abolition of the death penalty, 
and the holding of elections. Though the UNHCR acknowledges various continued 
                                                 
110 “We are afraid of the truth.” 
111 The final two of the six cessation clauses are known as the “ceased circumstances” clauses, 
Article I, C(5) and (6) in the 1951 UNHCR Convention. 
112 UNHCR, The Cessation Clauses, par. 25-26.  
113 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, par. 28-30.  
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concerns about security, persecution, and safety, it maintains that conditions in the 
country are “good enough” for refugees to return.114 
Many refugees, however, protest that the country is still unsafe and that their 
impending forced repatriation is both premature and dangerous. The government works 
hard to demonstrate the successes of its genocide recovery efforts, both to its people and 
to the rest of the world by emphasizing improvements in infrastructure, education 
systems, and healthcare. The government reinforces a simplistic and ahistorical rhetoric 
whereby all the Tutsis were innocent and all the Hutus were guilty in the massacres, 
genocide and civil war of the mid-1990s. Within such a neat narrative, the Tutsi-
dominated RPF government denies responsibility for any violence or continuing 
repression. As long as the Rwandan government continues to be repressive and avoids the 
difficult work attached to accountability, reconciliation, and recovery, refugees have 
legitimate bases for fear and reluctance to return. This chapter demonstrates that 
statistical indicators, buildings and roads, social welfare projects, cultural and educational 
projects, and stories and symbols of transformation and improvement hide as much as 
they tell.   
Infrastructures and Symbols of “Progress” in the “New Rwanda” 
The Rwandan government has worked hard to demonstrate to its people and the 
rest of the world that it has successfully recovered from the 1994 Genocide. After the 
complete devastation and ruin of Genocide, the government tasked itself with rebuilding 
the entire country—infrastructure, political systems, a wounded and traumatized 
population—from the ground up. The ruling government operates under the assumption 
that physical recovery—the tangible reconstructing of the country’s infrastructures and 
                                                 
114 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, par. 28-32.  
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the establishment of a range of programs—constitutes progress, and that they both 
somehow denote resolution and reconciliation in the sense of individual healing, 
forgiveness, reparation of past wrongs, and the establishment of a stable, long-lasting 
peace. The government of Rwanda has significant interest in convincing a range of 
institutions and groups that ethnic and other divisions in the country have been resolved 
and that reconciliation for past wrongdoings is well under way. 
While it has been difficult and slow work, many meaningful steps have been 
taken over the past two decades and a number of changes have occurred, although not all 
indicate a reconciled country that is safe or hospitable for every Rwandan. Under 
Kagame’s leadership—first as vice president, Minister of Defense, and de facto ruler, and 
later as titular President and autocrat—Rwanda has rebuilt and expanded its 
infrastructure. Today, tall, glass-clad office buildings form the skyline of downtown 
Kigali. Rwandans are especially proud of their roads, many of which are smoothly paved 
with painted curbs, a vast improvement from their pre-Genocide state.115 There is an 
appreciable difference and newness apparent to those crossing the northern border into 
Rwanda by car or bus. Figure 2 shows three images from the city of Kigali: directly after 
the Genocide; as it appears today; and as the government hopes it will look in the future. 
The images of present and future reflect enormous vision and impressive efforts to 
rebuild and create anew, as well as a government-led effort to convince observers that 
Rwanda is a stable, developed country with social conditions fundamentally different and 
improved from those that plagued Rwanda before and during the Genocide of 1994.  
 
 
                                                 
115 See World Health Organization, "Rwanda's road-safety transformation," Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 85, no. 6 (2007): 425-426. 
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Figure 2: Kigali – Past, Present, Future 
 
 
Kigali after Genocide:  
 
Ten thousand Rwandans were 
slaughtered in Nyamata Church 
during the 1994 Genocide. 
Their clothes, in piles higher 
than the church pews, are 
shown here. Today, this site is a 
government-sponsored 
Genocide memorial. 
 
Source: 
http://www.africastories.org/unthin
kable-forgiveness/photo-gallery/# 
 
 
Kigali Today: 
 
Over the past two decades, 
Rwanda’s capital has gone from 
complete ruin to a large thriving 
city. 
 
Source: personal photo, taken 
December 2011.  
 
 
Kigali Tomorrow: 
 
The Rwandan government has 
outlined ambitious plans for 
Kigali’s growth and expansion. 
Here is what they hope the city 
will look like in the future. 
 
Source: The Republic of Rwanda, 
Kigali Conceptual Master Plan, 
(Kigali: Rwanda Development 
Board, 2008). 
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 Hospitals and healthcare, likewise, have been built, rebuilt, or developed. 
Currently, over ninety percent of Rwanda’s population is insured through a community-
based health insurance initiative called Mutuelles de Santé. The government heavily 
subsidizes the program, and Rwandan citizens pay about $6 each year to take part. Its 
success is quantifiable—noticeable decreases in HIV rates and infant mortality,116 higher 
life expectancies, greater family planning coverage and resources117—and has been 
lauded by a range of governments, international organizations, and funders.118 The World 
Health Organization reports that Rwanda’s health initiative, Mutuelles de Santé, which 
has comprehensive reach, has prompted more Rwandans to seek needed medical care, 
and has significantly reduced the financial hardships associated with sickness.119  
Additionally, the Global Fund Against AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) has 
funded a “Health System Strengthening Project” in Rwanda to bolster the work of the 
government’s Mutuelles de Santé initiative. The organization reports significant 
                                                 
116 Efforts at reducing incidence of both HIV and of infant and child mortality have also 
manifested in a number of health programs that complement the expansion of Mutuelles de Santé. 
One such program, a joint effort of the Rwandan Ministry of Health and the international non-
profit Partners in Health, has been successful in increasing health service utilization and survival 
rates for infants exposed to HIV. See Neil Gupta, et al., "Clinical Outcomes of a Comprehensive 
Integrated Program for HIV-Exposed Infants: A 3-Year Experience Promoting HIV-Free Survival 
in Rural Rwanda," Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 62, no. 4 (2013): 110, 
112-114. 
117 The Republic of Rwanda, "Health System," 2012, http://www.gov.rw/Health-System 
(accessed February 15, 2013); Center for Health Market Innovations, "Mutuelles de Sante, 
Rwanda," 2013, http://healthmarketinnovations.org/program/mutuelles-de-sante-rwanda-0 
(accessed February 15, 2013); Dorothy E. Logie, Michael Rowson and Felix Ndagije, 
"Innovations in Rwanda's health system: looking to the future," The Lancet 372, no. 9634 (July 
2008): 257-258. 
118 Among those praising Rwanda’s health sector reforms is the United Nations Development 
Programme, which cites increased availability to the ARVs used to treat HIV, increased use of 
health facilities, increase use of “modern” contraceptives, and reduced infant mortality rates as 
notable achievements. See United Nations Development Programme, One UN Programme: 
United Nations Rwanda, Report 2008, (United Nations, 2008), 7, 18-20.  
119 Priyanka Saksena, Adélio Fernandes Antunes, Ke Xu, Laurent Musango and Guy Carrin, 
Impact of mutual health insurance on access to health care and financial risk protection in 
Rwanda (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2010), 208. 
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successes in several health status indicators: increased health service utilization, TB 
treatment completion rates up from 58% in 2002 to 85% in 2006, and a decrease in 
under-5 child mortality from 196/1000 in 2002 to 152/1000 in 2007.120 In the past few 
years, the New York Times has also published several articles praising Rwanda’s health 
system progress and development, with titles such as “Rwanda’s Health Care Miracle,”121 
“In Desperately Poor Rwanda, Most Have Health Insurance,”122 and “Rwanda’s Health 
Care Success Story.”123 In these articles, the authors praise Rwanda’s model of universal 
heath care coverage, the ability of communities to identify and help their poorest 
members, and the favorable outcomes achieved at small, local, “no-frills” clinics. The 
successes of Rwanda’s health initiatives have indeed been far-reaching. 
Post-Genocide Rwanda has made impressive technological advancements and 
innovations. Some are designed to meet health care challenges. One program, called 
TRACnet,124 allows health care providers to submit and receive reports of the 
antiretroviral treatment programs (ARVs) used to fight HIV through a system of simple, 
solar powered phones.125 The government has also established or sponsored a number of 
                                                 
120 Andreas Kalk, Natalie Groos, Jean-Claude Karasi and Elisabeth Girrbach, "Health systems 
strengthening through insurance subsidies: the GFATM experience in Rwanda," Tropical 
Medicine and International Health 15, no. 1 (2009): 94-95. 
121 Tina Rosenburg, "Rwanda's Health Care Miracle," The New York Times, July 3, 2012. 
122 Donald G. McNeil, "In Desperately Poor Rwanda, Most Have Health Insurance," The New 
York Times, June 14, 2010. 
123 Donald G. McNeil, "Rwanda's Health Care Success Story," The New York Times, February 4, 
2013. 
124 This name was taken from the Treatment and Research of AIDS Centre (TRAC) division of 
Rwanda’s Ministry of Health. 
125 PEPFAR, "TRACnet enhances monitoring of ART scale-up," The United States' Presidents 
Emergency Plan for Aids Relief, February 2006, http://www.pepfar.gov/press/84654.htm 
(accessed March 2, 2013); Allison Veen, "Rwanda: TRACnet Mobile Health Information 
System," New Media and Development Communication, 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/nelson/newmediadev/Health.html (accessed March 2, 2013); 
Sabin Nsanzimana, et al., "Cell Phone-Based and Internet-Based Monitoring and Evaluation of 
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programs to facilitate the economic recovery of the country. One, called the e-Soko 
project,126 enables farmers to better negotiate fair prices for their crops. When farmers 
text the name of a particular agricultural commodity, such as cassava, to the service, they 
receive an instant response citing the item’s current market value price. They can then 
meet the offers of crop traders with fair counter offers that are informed with immediate 
information.127 
The Rwandan government has also enacted a number of educational reforms. 
Rwandan children now have access to nine years of free, basic education, with plans to 
progressively expand the system to include the completion of secondary school—a full 
twelve years. Before the Genocide, all Rwandans were required to pay often prohibitive 
fees so that their children could attend school. The percentage of students finishing 
primary school who enter secondary school has increased from 58.3% in 2005 to 95% in 
2010. These changes have allowed greater access to primary education for the country’s 
poor.128 Rwanda has over thirty institutions of higher learning, with the most prestigious, 
the National University in Butare, currently enrolling twelve thousand students. The 
number and proportion of female students attaining higher education has also decidedly 
                                                 
the National Antiretroviral Treatment Program During Rapid Scale-Up in Rwanda: TRACnet, 
2004–2010," Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 59, no. 2 (2012): 17-33. 
126 The name of this project, “e-Soko,” is a play on the Kinyarwanda word for market, isoko, 
pronounced the same way.   
127 John Vrakas, "From Genocide to 3G: Innovations in Rwanda," Harvard Kennedy School 
Review, 2012: 84. 
128 Katrin Park, "Rwanda's reforms boost progress on school enrolment," United Nations 
Development Programme: Newsroom, May 10, 2010, 
http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/may/100507-rwanda-education.en (accessed March 2, 
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increased, up 15% in the five years from 2005 to 2010 alone. Rwanda cites these 
achievements as measures of its success, recovery, and reconciliation.129  
Re-Education, Propaganda, and Performance in the “New Rwanda” 
The government is proud of these and other indicators of societal progress. It has 
launched a multifaceted propaganda campaign to spread the idea of the country’s 
recovery and advancement to its own people and international observers, including aid 
donors, potential aid donors, politically powerful states, and potential tourists. The 
narratives and attached symbolisms of Genocide recovery have permeated government-
sponsored newspapers, advertisements, videos, and programs. The government of 
Rwanda also instituted several mandatory educational programs to ensure that Rwandans 
accept and propagate its post-Genocide accomplishments. 
One educational program , ingando, is composed of “solidarity camps” aimed at 
re-educating Rwandan students, politicians, community leaders, and ex-soldiers and 
combatants with carefully crafted rhetoric. Kagame’s government uses ingando as a way 
“to plant the seeds of reconciliation, and to disseminate pro-RPF ideology through 
political indoctrination.”130 Initially, the ingando solidarity camps were designed to 
engage former Tutsi refugees in the government’s narratives of reconciliation and 
recovery, though they have evolved and expanded. The ingando programs can last from 
several days to several months and are in theory compulsory for all ex-soldiers and ex-
combatants. Upon completion of ingando, members of the newly “demilitarized” 
population are given aid packages and allowed to reintegrate into civilian life. 
                                                 
129 Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs, An Overview of Progress Towards the 
Social and Economic Development of Rwanda, (Kigali: The Republic of Rwanda, 2011), 6-7. 
130 Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps,” 202. 
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Rwandan secondary school graduates also participate in two-month long ingando 
solidarity camps before beginning their time at university. In these camps, people study 
subjects like the “Achievements of the Government” and “The Dignity of the 
Banyarwanda.” Banyarwanda translates as “people who come from Rwanda,” and is 
used to describe people of both Hutu and Tutsi origins. Its use here reflects the 
government’s efforts to move beyond the country’s historical ethnic divisions and 
promote national unity. Ethnic divisions and identities are presented as colonially-created 
divisive myths. The camps focus, instead, on the organic oneness and homogeneity of 
Rwandans under Kagame’s leadership. For students, these ingando camps are an 
opportunity for the government to “create a generation of RPF loyalists,” according to 
Chi Mgbako.131 By targeting its educated youth—those who will be responsible for 
Rwanda’s future—the government hopes to convince Rwandans that Rwanda is on the 
road to recovery, that its progress has been great, and that progress and recovery are to be 
attributed to the efforts and leadership of the ruling government.132  
Rwandan refugees who repatriate must participate in similar programs. Rwanda’s 
Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR) released a statement 
in January 2013 announcing that effective immediately all returning refugees must 
participate in new “civic education” programs and involvement in these programs is 
required for starting their new life in Rwanda. According to MIDIMAR, the purpose of 
these government programs is to provide returnees with “relevant information about 
positive changes regarding developmental programs and social welfare of Rwandans,” 
                                                 
131 Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps,” 217. 
132 See Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps,” 203, 217; Andrea Purdeková, Rwanda's Ingando 
Camps: Liminality and the Reproduction of Power, Working Paper (Oxford: Refugee Studies 
Center, University of Oxford, 2011), 38-40; Tim Davis, "Rwanda: Ingango camps a ‘government 
tool of social engineering.’" NGO News Africa, October 6, 2011. 
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and to introduce returnees to “the overview of national values.”133 These camps and 
programs are intended to reshape and redirect the subjectivities, feelings, and public 
discourses of Rwandans. They also plant and reinforce the notion of a government-driven 
Genocide recovery and the importance of this particular government for stability and 
continued successes in the country.  
Figure 3: Ingando Solidarity Camps
134
 
 
Here, post-secondary 
school students 
participate in military 
training activities during 
a three-month long 
ingando solidarity camp 
in Nkumba, Rwanda. 
This photo was taken by 
a New Times staff 
member who attended 
the camp’s training 
closure ceremonies. 
 The government also mandates celebration of several holidays remembering 
Genocide and marking the country’s recovery processes. During Genocide 
Commemoration Week, which begins on 7 April, the anniversary of the start of the 1994 
Genocide, the country enters a period of nation-wide public mourning. Citizens 
participate in events like candlelight vigils, walks, speeches, visits to memorials, and 
required daily meetings where government-selected speakers lecture on the origins of 
Genocide and the country’s recovery successes.135 The events of the week are severely 
                                                 
133 Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs, Rwandan returnees to undergo civic 
education trainings, (Kigali: The Republic of Rwanda, 2013). 
134 Bonny Mukonbozi, "600 students complete ingando," The New Times, December 12, 2009. 
135 Jean de la Croix Tabaro, "Genocide commemoration week taken to village level," The New 
Times, February 8, 2013; Agnes Binagwaho, "Reflections on the Genocide commemoration 
week," The New Times, April 16, 2012. 
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traumatizing to many Rwandans, who often break down or experience vivid flashbacks. 
The Ministry of Health places ambulances and mental health professionals on location at 
all of the week’s major commemoration activities, to assist those Rwandans who require 
counseling or hospitalization. The act of public mourning, of collective commemoration 
of the atrocities of 1994, can be incredibly distressing.136 Later in the year, to mark the 
end of the Genocide and the triumphs of Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front, the country 
celebrates Liberation Day. Speeches, dances, and other remembrance acts are held 
throughout the capital.137 While in Kigali for the celebration of Rwanda’s 2012 
Liberation Day, I, along with everyone else, was expected to attend the day’s events. 
Those who were absent were publicly chastised by their neighbors, bosses, or families.  
 The Rwandan government projections of “progress” are not only meant for its 
citizens. Kagame has also crafted a carefully controlled narrative of “Genocide and 
recovery” for dissemination to the international community. His actions are largely 
financially motivated since the government relies heavily on foreign aid since the 1994 
Genocide: in the years immediately following the massacres, overseas development 
assistance accounted for over 95% of the country’s GDP.138 Nearly nineteen years later, 
Rwanda continues to be aid-dependent, as foreign aid from countries such as India, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, China, and the United States still constitutes about eighteen 
                                                 
136 Ian Palmer and Nsanzumuhire Firmin, "Mental health in post-genocide Rwanda," 
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percent of the country’s budget.139 Agricultural, health, and infrastructure initiatives 
continue to receive the highest proportions of foreign aid, as indicated by Appendix C: 
Top Twenty Foreign Aid Donors to Rwanda (Loans/Grants), 2010-2011.140  
The government markets its discourses of progress and recovery to rich, powerful 
donor nations and to the surrounding East African Community member countries through 
targeted tourism marketing and advertising campaigns. The country’s latest government 
tourism video, marketed through the its tourism twitter handle, @TravelRwanda,141 and 
posted on YouTube, begins with slow shots of perfectly-manicured hillsides, the 
beautiful great-lakes coastlines, and Rwandans dressed in traditional clothing 
enthusiastically drumming or dancing. The next minute or two of the video feature 
Rwandans enjoying two of the country’s more popular beers, Primus and Mutzig, while 
lounging on the beach or dancing at a nightclub. White foreigners follow a friendly 
Rwandan guide through the jungle, looking for gorillas. Most of the rest of the film is 
comprised of shots of hillsides or wildlife, with quick, periodic returns to bustling 
downtown Kigali throughout. The video provides a brief view of Rwanda’s main 
Genocide museum in Gisozi—proof perhaps, that the new Rwanda has come to terms 
with its past, memorialized it, and moved on. Upbeat local music plays over the entire ten 
minutes of the YouTube video.142 This video and others like it project Rwanda as the 
                                                 
139 International Monetary Fund, Rwanda: Fourth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument 
and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria--Staff Report; Press Release (Washington, 
D.C.: IMF, 2012), 7. 
140 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, National Budget: Revised 2010/2011 State 
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government wishes it to be viewed from the outside: beautiful, happy, developed, and 
recovered. 
Dance is also an important symbolic and embodied mechanism for showcasing 
recovery in Rwanda. The Rwandan national dance, intore, was traditionally an expression 
of Tutsi ethnic identity. Today, it is a war dance that tells the history of Rwanda, 
including the Genocide and the country’s subsequent pursuit of unity. It is often 
performed for tourists in the National Museum of Butare.143 I have seen intore 
performances in high schools and universities, in government-organized “reconciliation 
villages,” and during several Catholic masses in one of Kigali’s largest churches, Saint 
Michael. The dance begins with the women, who enter the performance area in lines. 
They dance with their arms raised above their heads, a symbol of the horned cows highly 
valued as symbols of wealth in rural Rwanda. Then the men enter, barefooted and 
wearing grass wigs, and re-enact a battle. The dance ends with the men from both sides of 
the battle coming together to embrace.  
Much of the country’s development efforts are organized under the Vision2020 
heading, a set of societal goals and targets that the government hopes to achieve by the 
year 2020. To showcase these goals and the country’s apparent progress, the government 
has released a series of videos featuring short interviews with government officials and 
regular citizens. These videos are published on the government’s YouTube channel, and 
can be viewed worldwide. Some interviews are in English, and those that are not have 
English subtitles. In a country where 90% of the population speaks Kinyarwanda, and 
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only the young, educated elite have a working command of English,144 this is clearly an 
effort to address English-speaking audiences, particularly in the United States and 
Europe, as well as other members of the East African Community, an organization which 
Rwandan has only recently joined.145 In one video, entitled “Kudatezuka ku Ntego – A 
Journey of Resilience,” several Rwandans share their views on the change the country 
has undergone since the 1994 Genocide. They all view the recovery efforts as successful. 
One man who appears to be a security officer claims, “Despite our dark times yesterday, 
today we enjoy peace and prosperity.” A middle-aged shop owner echoes his view, 
saying, “the progress in the last eighteen years proves that there can only be more 
accomplishments in the years to come. There will no longer be ignorance.”146 In each 
video, the government is credited for this progress and recovery and Rwandans are 
depicted as both appreciative and indebted. As one man, shown standing in front of his 
newly successful brick-making business, says, “I am grateful to the government for the 
good leadership and development.”147 
Hidden Truths and Realities in Post-Genocide Rwanda 
Some former refugees I interviewed, those who have returned to Rwanda, agree 
with the sentiment that the situation in Rwanda has changed fundamentally, and that it is 
safe for refugees to return and resettle. Cessation does not come into full effect until July 
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2013. Current returnees, therefore, have repatriated either independently of UNHCR laws 
or as a result of the intensifying efforts of the Rwandan government and asylum countries 
to promote voluntary repatriation before cessation comes into effect. These efforts, part 
of the United Nations’ “comprehensive strategy” for the termination of Rwanda’s refugee 
crisis, include publishing and distributing leaflets describing cessation and the current 
conditions in Rwanda; “go-and-see”/“come-and-tell” trips, where refugees are brought 
back to Rwanda for short, provisional visits; and meetings and discussions inside the 
camps between refugees and Rwandan government officials. Over three million Rwandan 
refugees have repatriated since the 1994 Genocide.148 
Of the returnees I interviewed, Patrick and Pascal were particularly adamant that 
Rwanda has not only changed for the better, but that the country owes a great debt of 
gratitude to President Paul Kagame for driving these changes. Patrick, who returned to 
Rwanda in 1996 after his family had lived in exile for over two decades, is proud of 
Rwanda and the changes he has seen. He lauds his president’s actions, boasting in our 
conversation, “Once His Excellency Paul Kagame saved our people, we could return. He 
liberated Rwanda and ended the violence of the Hutu. Now it is safe. We are happy 
here.” Patrick continued describing Kagame in such favorable terms, attributing to him an 
almost superhuman list of qualities and accomplishments. He repeatedly used the words 
“saved” and “liberated” to describe the RPF victory that ended the 1994 Genocide. 
 Pascal feels a similar sense of pride in the way Rwanda has changed since 
Genocide, echoing Patrick’s descriptions of Kagame. Pascal insists that Kagame “saved” 
Rwanda and that it was now safe. Pascal states matter-of-factly that “His Excellency Paul 
Kagame liberated our country and we returned home.” Usage of the honorific “His 
                                                 
148 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, par. 10-11. 
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Excellency,” which I heard commonly throughout the capital and in my interviews, 
suggests a kind of idol worship or monarchic relationship to President Kagame. Pascal 
describes in great detail the kinds of changes he sees in the country. He describes the 
rebuilding and development of infrastructure—roads, hospitals, tall buildings—again 
using the widespread language of the ruling Kagame government, insisting, “the 
leadership of Rwanda has a great mind for development. That is what they are working 
for. Someday Kigali will be like New York City, can’t you see that?” As we continued to 
talk in Pascal’s office, a primary school near downtown Kigali (umuji), he repeatedly 
gestured to the city view outside his window, exclaiming, “We have made much 
progress. Great progress. We have developed. See! Today we are an example for Africa.” 
 Patrick also uses this idea of Rwanda as a country others can model to talk about 
change and advancement: “We are very advanced, and all of Africa can now look to us.” 
Returnees hold on to the thought, which I heard often in casual conversation as well as in 
more formal interviews, that Rwanda today has moved past the shame of Genocide and is 
a place of which Rwandans can be proud. Patrick insists that Rwanda has been 
completely reconciled by joking about the high number of foreigners, or abazungu,149 
living in working in Rwanda’s capital. He laughed as he asked me, “Would you come to 
Rwanda if we were not reconciled? You are muzungu—of course you would leave if 
there was trouble. But here you are.” His description of Rwanda as reconciled suggests 
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his belief that the country’s change has moved beyond the superficialities of 
infrastructures or programs, and instead reflects a deep, meaningful transformation. 
 During our discussions, I asked Patrick and Pascal to discuss why they thought 
other refugees might be reluctant to return to Rwanda, especially if the country was as 
reformed as they described. Patrick rationalized the actions of those who continue to hold 
on to their refugee status by saying, “They must have a reason to stay away. It is possible 
that reason is ignorance. Maybe they have been away too long and forgotten their home. 
Some people do not return because they are the killers.” Pascal similarly suggested that 
some of the refugees who haven’t returned have done something wrong: “Those people 
who left after 1994, they think Rwanda is still the same. They think there has been no 
change. But look! Every day there are changes. It is so different now. Those who are 
afraid, they are the guilty.” For both men, Rwanda is a changed country and a safe place 
for all except those who fear justice. Importantly, both Patrick and Pascal are of Tutsi 
origin. Moreover, Patrick had never before lived in Rwanda since he was born to parents 
from the 1959 wage of refugees and Pascal had left as a young refugee in 1973. Thus 
neither lived in Rwanda during or immediately before the Genocide. The nature of 
transformation and change they perceive must be understood within contexts of personal 
and larger histories that produced their refugee experiences and their experiences of 
“return.”  
Pascal and Patrick’s views are not shared by those refugees who have yet to return 
to Rwanda.  Just one solitary refugee in Nakivaale, Marcel, loudly praised Kagame for 
being a wonderful president, describing the “progress” the society has made and how 
“advanced” it is—but this was only after he had looked furtively around the camp and 
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whispered to me “Il y a des espions ici ” (“There are spies here”). His fear and feelings of 
being watched reflect a collective sense of being under surveillance among the Rwandan 
Nakivaale refugees. Their fears are born of experience: the Rwandan government has 
begun asserting its presence in the camps, and on at least one occasion, Rwandan 
government forces entered the settlement, violently forced refugees and asylum seekers 
onto trucks, and drove them back to Rwanda against their will. Two men were killed in 
this 2010 “police operation.”150 Since 1994, government military forces have conducted 
massacres, raids, rapes, and murders against Rwandan refugees living in the eastern parts 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (which was called Zaire between 1971 and 
1997). After the Genocide, many Rwandans—mostly Hutu—fled to the country’s 
western neighbor where they lived in crowded refugee camps. Over the course of several 
years, the Rwandan government conducted violent raids on these camps, notably in 1996 
and 1998. According to a United Nations Security Council report describing the conflict, 
“the killings … by the RPA constitute crimes against humanity, as does the denial of 
humanitarian assistance to Rwandan Hutu refugees.” The report contends that “some of 
the killings [in refugee camps] may constitute Genocide.”151 These attacks were attempts 
by the RPF to force Hutu refugees to repatriate, since the Rwandan government accuses 
many of them of committing genocidal crimes.152  
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Several refugees insisted in no uncertain terms that Rwanda hasn’t changed in 
substantive ways. Didier, a farmer who fled immediately after Genocide, told me how 
Rwanda today is only different for some: “The country has only changed if you are Tutsi. 
For us, the Hutu, it is no different. We are so many but we cannot speak.” For him, 
Rwanda remains dangerous because he is not a member of Kagame’s party or ethnic 
group. Didier alludes to a practice of silence-keeping, of restricted truth-telling, so 
common in Rwanda that it has been given a name—ceceka. The Hutu must keep their 
silence, because their stories will not be believed or accepted. Their identity makes it 
dangerous for them to speak. Emmanuel, another Nakivaale refugee, shared his fears of 
the current government and its policies: “They tell us to go back, but what we ran from is 
still there. They killed our family, destroyed our relatives, so how can we go back?” 
When I asked who “they” are, he responded, “They are the winners, the victorious. The 
Tutsi RPF. They have committed crimes.” Didier and Emmanuel believe that Rwandans 
who do not accept the government’s one-sided and neatly-formulated narrative of 
Genocide—which paints all Tutsi as blameless victims, the RPF as sinless saviors, and 
most Hutu as vicious killers—are in danger. 
 Grace, a middle-aged mother of six, lived in Nakivaale with her husband until he 
returned to Rwanda to check the living conditions there. He had promised to send for her 
and their children if it was safe for them to join him. Five years later, she has heard 
nothing from him. As she puts it, “if things are good in Rwanda, he will come for me. I 
am still waiting.” Today, she suspects he has been arrested, and perhaps tortured or 
killed, by the government. In her mind Rwanda remains unsafe until she hears otherwise 
from her husband. For Emmanuel, Didier, and Grace, Rwanda has not undergone the 
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“fundamental and durable” changes necessary for them to return—it is still a very 
dangerous place.  
Among the refugees that I spoke with, a sense of unresolved and continuing 
injustices ranked high in explaining their feelings that the country has not undergone the 
changes necessary for the invocation of cessation. Their understandings stem from the 
Rwandan government’s denial of past wrongdoings, the authoritarian nature of the 
current regime, and the unwarranted accusations and persecutions of Rwandan citizens. 
Emmanuel talked about mass graves, which he described as the “graves of those people 
Kagame has ‘not killed,’” as a particular source of fear and his reluctance to return. Jean-
Pierre, a teacher, described these hidden graves as well: “les soldats de RPA, ils aiment 
cacher les morts. Comme si ça n’est jamais passé” (“the RPF soldiers, they like to hide 
the dead. Like it never happened”). When I questioned the possibility and motivations 
behind such actions, coming from a government that publicly proclaims the importance 
of truth-seeking, he met my doubts with a simple question—“Si tu as tué quelqu’un, 
dirais-tu ?” (“If you had killed someone, would you tell?”). 
A number of transnational rights organizations have questioned Rwanda’s 
Genocide recovery and whether Rwanda truly is safe for all Rwandans, calling attention 
to evidence of a dangerous political climate. In response to the UNHCR’s 
recommendation of cessation, Amnesty International released several reports to relevant 
refugee asylum countries advising them to oppose cessation. The reports urge these 
countries not to rely on either the United Nations’ or Rwanda’s reports of contemporary 
country conditions, but instead to conduct their own investigations, paying special 
attention to four broadly important matters: 
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1. Adherence to fair trial standards; 
 
2. Mechanisms for the respect and protection of human rights; 
 
3. Freedom of association and peaceful assembly, including tolerating criticism and 
dissent; 
 
4. Ability of human rights organizations to monitor violations and advocate for 
remedies.153 
 
The reports outline some of Amnesty International’s “serious concerns” regarding the 
Rwandan government’s reports of changes and the inappropriateness of invoking the 
cessation clauses at this time. The ruling government has institutionalized restrictions on 
expression, speech, and association with vague and overbroad laws focused on 
proponents of “genocide ideology.” The government’s interpretation of such laws 
“criminalizes dissenting voices and speech permitted by international conventions.”154 
These laws force Rwandans to censor themselves and conceal the truths of their 
Genocide experiences. They also intimidate Rwandans into hiding their dissent or 
dissatisfaction in relation to post-Genocide change and recovery efforts in Rwanda.155 
The Rwandan military, or Rwanda Patriotic Army—a division of the RPF ruling party—
has been responsible for enforced disappearances, torture, unlawful detention, detention 
in secret or concealed locations, and other forms of mistreatment of civilians suspected of 
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threatening national security. Amnesty International argues that these behaviors render a 
blanket cessation of refugee status as premature, dangerous, and unlawful.156 
 Similarly, the Fahamu Refugee Programme, a UK-based transnational refugee 
advocacy organization that is funded by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation,157 
describes Rwanda’s overall political situation as “repressive, fragile, and unstable,” with 
an environment restricting speech, debate, and criticism of the government. The 
organization suggests that Rwanda has a capacity to return very quickly to frightening 
levels of violence.158 As the RPF continues to tighten its control over voices of political 
dissent and opposition, and as the government continues to deny its opponents any 
legitimate legal space for criticism, other observers argue that it is increasingly likely that 
Kagame will intensify violence to silence dissidents. A civil war, popular uprisings, a 
proxy war in the DRC, or an escalating and disproportionate security response from the 
government are all real possibilities in Rwanda.159 
 Despite extensive evidence to the contrary, the government of Rwanda has 
emphatically and systematically denied responsibility for crimes against humanity that 
occurred either during or after the Genocide. The legitimacy of President Kagame’s rule 
stems from his party’s role in ending the Genocide, not participating in it. According to 
Filip Reyntjens, “the 1994 genocide has become an ideological weapon allowing the RPF 
to acquire and maintain victim status and, as a perceived form of compensation, to enjoy 
                                                 
156 See Amnesty International, Memorandum to the Government of Uganda, 7-9; Amnesty 
International, Memorandum to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 6-9; 
Amnesty International, Rwanda--Shrouded in Secrecy. 
157 Fahamu Refugee Programme, "About Us: Who We Are," Fahamu Refugee Programme, 2012, 
http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/about-us-0 (accessed April 13, 2013). 
158 Fahamu Refugee Programme, Rwanda: Cessation of Refugee Status is Unwarranted: 
Memorandum of Fact and Law (The Fahamu Refugee Programme, 2011), 7. 
159 Jennifer G. Cooke, Rwanda: Assessing Risks to Stability, (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 18-19. 
                                                                                                                           Rabideau      89 
complete immunity.”160 Kagame and his party are also culpable in the Genocide, 
however. Tens of thousands of Rwandan civilians—by some estimates, as many as one 
hundred thousand—were killed by Kagame’s RPF during the hundred days of terror. In 
1994, Rwandans experienced both civil war and genocide, with people of both ethnicities 
as perpetrators and victims.161 
 After 1994, RPF crimes continued, partially obscured by the lingering fear and 
horror of Genocide and the perceived heroics of Kagame’s party. The army, no longer a 
rebel group but now a government-affiliated military, carried out massacres in the Kibeho 
IDP camp in April of 1995. From October 1997 to January 1998, an estimated 10,000 
unarmed civilians were killed in Rwanda by government forces. Most of these murders 
took place in Gisenyi, a prefecture in northwest Rwanda. Men, women, children, and the 
elderly were victims of the violence. Whole families were murdered while trying to flee 
or huddled together, hidden in their homes. A handful of RPF soldiers and officers 
responsible for these reprisal killings were later tried in military courts. Most were found 
not guilty. In one instance, four officers were sentenced to 28 months in prison—not for 
the deaths of over a hundred unarmed civilians, for which they were responsible, but for 
“failing to assist persons in danger.” These “persons in danger” are the same ones that 
they murdered.162 
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 Three legal institutional mechanisms have emerged as the foundation of 
Rwanda’s pursuit of post-Genocide of justice and reconciliation: the national court 
system, modified traditional justice in the form of gacaca, and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, or ICTR. Certain aspects of these mechanisms are cause for 
concern. The community-based gacaca courts and the national court system are 
perceived as a kind of victors’ justice that is “overwhelmingly Tutsi.”163 The perception 
from both Hutu and Tutsi is that perpetrators must be punished in order for reconciliation 
to occur.164  Judges in the gacaca courts as well as the national court system are subject 
to control and influence of the RPF, and risk persecution if they publicly espouse or 
acknowledge views or truths different from those of the RPF government.165 In the 
gacaca court system, Hutu whose relatives were killed or property destroyed by the RPF 
are not allowed to raise their cases, and Hutu who were persecuted are often afraid they 
won’t have a chance to defend themselves.166 
The ICTR is flawed as well. It is designed to pursue a slow, expensive justice, and 
only for a few, high-level organizers.167 This court was created through a resolution of the 
United Nations Security Council, passed in November of 1994. Located in Arusha, 
Tanzania, the ICTR is run by the United Nations and its member states.168 Its first trials 
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did not begin until 1997, three years after the Genocide. By 2005, it had tried and judged 
fewer than thirty genocidaires or suspected genocidaires, and had 26 ongoing trials.169 
Limited resources and the international requirements of extensive, formalized 
investigations result in punishments that are realized very slowly, and sometimes not at 
all.170 
 The refugees of Nakivaale voice particular concern that government-perpetrated 
injustices have intensified through gacaca. Emmanuel says that these courts heavily 
favored the Tutsi and those allied with the RPF, and often wrongly victimize Hutu, 
saying, “anyone can stand up and say anything, and if they are Tutsi they will be 
believed. If they are Hutu they must keep their silence.” Clément, the priest, expressed a 
similar view of gacaca: Rwanda has not changed or recovered and gacaca has been 
detrimental and one-sided rather than helpful. But in his mind, this is not the biggest 
challenge facing potential returnees. As he put it, 
Mais le premier problème, le plus grand problème, c’est que nous avons peur de 
la vérité. Nous avons peur d’un autre génocide, et qu’est qu’on peut faire ? Rien. 
Rien du tout. Nous pouvons pas parler honnêtement ou franchement parce qu’il y 
a tellement d’idées, de histoires, et de crimes que son Excellence refuse de 
reconnaître. 
(But the first problem, the biggest problem, is that we are afraid of the truth. We 
are afraid of another genocide, and what can we do? Nothing. Nothing at all. We 
cannot speak honestly or openly because there are so many ideas, stories, and 
crimes that His Excellency refuses to recognize.) 
 
 Many refugees believe that conditions in Rwanda are similar to those that led to 
massacre and genocide: rule is repressive and unaccountable; the environment is not 
hospitable to honest discussion and debate; and punishment based on collective ethnic- or 
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ideologically-based accusations of guilt dominates in the “new Rwanda.” While this 
Rwanda is, indeed, different and new, it retains many of the “old” problems in updated 
institutional and discursive forms. Refugees worry about the impact of cessation on their 
lives. Didier, a farmer who left immediately after genocide, told me, “they have falsely 
accused us. That is the same as if I was guilty. If I go back I will have great shame and I 
will be punished.” Jean-Pierre lamented the fact that, in his mind, the Rwandan 
government views all those reluctant to return as genocidaires who must be punished. 
~ 
Rwanda has changed in several positive ways since the 1994 Genocide, according to 
independent analysts and scholars. But the ruling government is also responsible for past 
and present discourses, institutions, and practices of repression and violence.  Military 
forces go largely unpunished for mass atrocities and human rights violations. The 
government refuses to accept responsibility for the massacre of thousands of unarmed 
civilians. Kagame’s regime is intolerant of dissent and political opposition. In the views 
of many Rwandan refugees and independent analysts and scholars, there is still neither 
peace nor justice in Rwanda. Refugees have very real reasons to fear forced repatriation 
through application of the cessation clauses. Clément, thinking of the country that was 
once his and the struggles it continues to face, questioned the ability of the country to 
recover without justice: “Comment est-ce qu’on peut guérir sans paix? Comment est-ce 
qu’on peut trouver la paix si on n’a pas de justice?” (“How can we heal without peace? 
How can we find peace if we have no justice?”) Rebuilding infrastructure, economic and 
health indicators, and the success of some social programs are not the same as justice and 
do not resolve the political and personal factors that makes him and many other refugees 
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resist return. If the scheduled cessation forces Rwandan refugees to return in July 2013, 
they will be forced to a “home” that is not particularly hospitable to complex truths, 
accountability, or reconciliation. 
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Conclusion 
 
“I am Rwandan; I had to come back. As a refugee I had no home, no opportunity, no 
future. I walked and I worked but inside I was dead. Now, here, I am alive again. I am 
home.” 
~Claire, returnee, Kigali 
 
 “The man who killed my children is now the leader of Rwanda. How can you tell me the 
country has changed? I have great fear and small hope […] every day I wish I will die, 
so this refugee life can be over. But still, it is better than return.” 
~Antoine, refugee, Nakivaale Refugee Settlement 
 
One evening during the summer I spent researching and interviewing in Rwanda and 
Uganda, I was relaxing in the living room of my Rwandan home with my host brothers 
and sisters. We sprawled across the couch and the floor, munching on avocados and 
drinking warm milk. All eyes were glued to the television—weeknights at 8 o’clock, a 
Portuguese soap opera plays on Rwandan TV, badly dubbed in French. My Rwandan 
family follows it religiously. On this night, poor, unsuspecting Miguel was served a glass 
of poisoned red wine by his jealous wife. His lover walks in some time later and, upon 
finding his cold, stiff body, frantically begins to dial 911. 
Curious, I turned to my sister. 
 “What’s the number for emergencies here?” 
 She doesn’t know. Half-jokingly, I chastise her: “Really, you should know it! 
What if something happened? Everyone in America knows to call 911!” 
 She shifted her gaze from the screen to look at me. 
 “I have no reason to know it,” she said, “There are no killings in Rwanda.” 
 She paused for a moment, biting her lower lip. “There are no killings in Rwanda,” 
she tells me again, “not anymore. We have had enough.” 
 Then she turned back towards the television. 
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 I spent the summer of 2012 interviewing survivors of the 1994 Genocide and its 
political aftermath. On every street corner, I passed the purple and white banners that 
proudly proclaimed, “18 years!” Often, I saw people cutting their grass with machetes, 
the weapon of choice those years ago. But I was, and am, still able to forget—sometimes, 
for a moment—the fresh, raw, and red nature of the pain and trauma of Genocide for so 
many Rwandans. The ability to not think about it is an enormous luxury. My default, my 
normal, does not include this kind of memory, trauma, fear, or sorrow. 
 Few Rwandans can say the same. Certainly, among the refugees and former 
refugees I spoke with, there was a constant, pervasive ache of grief, dread, or unease. 
And yet, in this context, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has 
decided to invoke its “ceased circumstances” cessation clauses for these Rwandan 
refugees. Many of them—over one hundred thousand men, women, and children—will 
be forced to repatriate. Representing a continuing crisis spanning decades of Rwandan 
history, these refugees fled the country for very real reasons—massacre, Genocide, 
oppression, persecution—and a large number harbor an intense, deep-seated, and justified 
fear about their impending forced return to Rwanda. Cessation forces them to return to 
the source of their suffering. 
 In its recommendation of cessation, the UNHCR notes that its “ceased 
circumstances” clauses should only apply to those refugees who fled Rwanda prior to 
1999. More recent refugees, many of whose flight was prompted by political persecution 
from the current government, should not yet be forced to return. All refugees, especially 
those in who dread repatriation, should be presented with options for local integration, 
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alternative legal status, or cessation exemption.171 If lawfully implemented, cessation 
should therefore exclude many of those with a legitimate and continued fear of Rwanda’s 
current political regime. The result could be a cessation in which some refugees, who 
have so far avoided return because they lack information about Kagame’s post-Genocide 
Rwanda, or because they lack transportation, or because the process of return seems 
daunting and un-navigable, are presented with a solution in which Rwanda, the UNHCR, 
and their country of asylum come together to provide the assistance they need to 
repatriate. Cessation could be an opportunity for a new start, a chance to reestablish 
themselves in a stable, healing community of Rwandans. It could be an opportunity to 
create a real, permanent home. 
 For other refugees—those who remain in exile not due to a lack of opportunity to 
return, but due to a legitimate fear of what awaits them if they do—the recommendation 
of cessation comes prematurely. The men and women I spoke with in the Nakivaale 
Refugee Settlement are deeply afraid that cessation will be applied indiscriminately, and 
will disregard their often compelling individual fears of repatriation. In Nakivaale, the 
potential for a blanket application of the clause is high. Not once in my conversations 
with the settlement’s commander, or in my discussions with a member of Uganda’s 
Office of the Prime Minister, which handles refugee affairs, did either man indicate that 
cessation is not intended to be universal. Most refugees were unaware that the clause had 
temporal restrictions or that individual exemptions are possible. They see cessation as 
unavoidable, and as an opportunity for Nakivaale to purge itself of Rwandans. Even 
Clément, one of the few refugees I spoke with who had substantial knowledge of the 
cessation clauses and their legal application, suspects that all Nakivaale Rwandans will 
                                                 
171 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, par. 15-16, 18, 31, 33-37.  
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be forced to return. Referring to the settlement officials, he told me, “they want 
Nakivaale to be freed of all Rwandans.” However, the settlement is growing. Many new 
asylum seekers, mostly from Somalia and South Sudan, are fleeing to Nakivaale, and the 
settlement could better accommodate these incoming refugees if its current residents 
repatriated.172  
 But Rwanda will not be truly ready to welcome back all of its refugees until it has 
embraced a deeper, fuller reconciliation. Real healing will not come from government-
dictated policies and programs, nor will it develop as long as individual stories, truths, 
and fears are hidden by state discourses and narratives. Victims and perpetrators continue 
to suffer. Perpetrators must accept responsibility for their actions and whatever pain, 
guilt, or shame comes with it.173 For Hutu and Tutsi, perpetrator and victim, 
understanding the past and having the opportunity to recognize and share their personal 
experiences may help lessen the trauma of Genocide and promote healing.174 Some have 
found healing in the church, where they can outwardly and collectively express their 
pain, hope, or fears through music and prayer.175 Others have found peace through the 
arts. Many have discovered that having a creative outlet through which they can build 
and create something new is therapeutic.176 
 Every Rwandan I spoke to, both in my interviews and informally, insisted that the 
hope for shared healing and recover in Rwanda, if there was any, lay with its youth. The 
children, the next generation, the innocent—they are what the future holds. They are 
                                                 
172 Interview with Godfred, Deputy Camp Commander, 2011. 
173 Ervin Staud, Laurie Anne Pearlman and Vachel Miller, "Healing the Roots of Genocide in 
Rwanda," Peace Review 15, no. 3 (2003): 288. 
174 Ibid., 290. 
175 Catherine Newhouse, "A Haven for Healing," Christianity Today 55, no. 12 (2011): 17-19. 
176 Starr A. Wood, "Making a Wish in Rwanda: The Restoration of Hope," Affilia: Journal of 
Women and Social Work 22, no. 2 (2007): 223. 
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growing up in a country with a strong education system, a rapidly growing economy, and 
a developing health care sector. They were born after Genocide. Though the future 
stability of Rwanda remains precarious, there is a chance that they will never know 
violence of the scale and intensity that Rwanda saw in 1994. They are the dreamers and 
the builders of tomorrow, and have the potential to create a Rwanda to which the 
country’s refugees can safely return. 
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Appendix A: The Cessation Clauses—UNHCR and OAU 
 
From the UNHCR 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Chapter 1, 
Article 1(C). “Ceased circumstances” cessation clauses in italics:  
 
This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if:  
 
(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality; or 
 
(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or 
 
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of 
his new nationality; or 
 
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or 
outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or 
 
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has 
been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail 
himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; Provided that this 
paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A(1) of this article 
who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for 
refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality; 
 
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in 
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, 
able to return to the country of his former habitual residence; 
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A 
(1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous 
persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence. 
 
From the OAU’s 1967 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, Article 1 (4). “Ceased circumstances” cessation clause in italics: 
 
This Convention shall cease to apply to any refugee if:  
 
(a) he has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality, or,  
 
(b) having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily reacquired it, or, 
 
(c) he has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of 
his new nationality, or,  
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(d) he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or 
outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution, or,  
 
(e) he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he was 
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of 
the protection of the country of his nationality, or,  
 
(f) he has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside his country of refuge 
after his admission to that country as a refugee, or,  
 
(g) he has seriously infringed the purposes and objectives of this Convention. 
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Appendix B: Full UNHCR and OAU Definitions of “Refugee” 
 
From the UNHCR 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Chapter 1, 
Article 1 
 
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall  
apply to any person who: 
 
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 
30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 
1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International 
Refugee Organization; 
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization 
during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being 
accorded to persons who fulfill the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section; 
 
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to 
wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term “the country 
of his nationality” shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and 
a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his 
nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not 
availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national. 
 
B. 
(1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words “events occurring before 1 
January 1951” in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either: 
 
(a) “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951”; or 
 
(b) “events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951”, and 
each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, 
ratification or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for 
the purpose of its obligations under this Convention. 
 
(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time 
extend its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section 
A if:  
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(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality; or 
 
(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or 
 
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of 
his new nationality; or 
 
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or 
outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or 
 
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has 
been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail 
himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; Provided that this 
paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A(1) of this article 
who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for 
refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality; 
 
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in 
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, 
able to return to the country of his former habitual residence; 
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A 
(1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous 
persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence. 
 
D. This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs 
or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees protection or assistance.When such protection or assistance has ceased for any 
reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with 
the  relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these 
persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention. 
 
E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent 
authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and 
obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country. 
 
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom 
there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, 
a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments 
drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious 
non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as 
a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations. 
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The UNHCR 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees removed the temporal 
restrictions given above: 
 
Aticle 1 (2): For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term “refugee” shall, except as 
regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the 
definition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words “As a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951 and ...” “and the words”... “a result of such events”, in article 1 A 
(2) were omitted. 
 
From the OAU’s 1967 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, Article 1 
 
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "refugee" shall mean every person who, 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
 
2. The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part 
or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of 
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality. 
 
3. In the case of a person who has several nationalities, the term "a country of which he is 
a national" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall 
not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of which he is a national if, 
without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the 
protection of one of the countries of which he is a national. 
 
4. This Convention shall cease to apply to any refugee if:  
 
(a) he has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality, or,  
 
(b) having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily reacquired it, or, 
 
(c) he has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of 
his new nationality, or,  
 
(d) he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or 
outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution, or,  
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(e) he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he was 
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of 
the protection of the country of his nationality, or,  
 
(f) he has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside his country of refuge 
after his admission to that country as a refugee, or,  
 
(g) he has seriously infringed the purposes and objectives of this Convention. 
 
5. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom 
the country of asylum has serious reasons for considering that:  
 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision 
in respect of such crimes;  
 
(b) he committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior 
to his admission to that country as a refugee;  
 
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the  
Organization of African Unity;  
 
(d) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United  
Nations. 
 
6. For the purposes of this Convention, the Contracting State of Asylum shall determine 
whether an applicant is a refugee. 
                                                                                                                           Rabideau      115 
Appendix C: Top Twenty Foreign Aid Donors to Rwanda (loans plus 
grants), 2010-2011 
 
Donor Total aid, 
by donor 
(USD) 
Government 
Branch/Ministry 
Aid 
amount by 
Ministry 
(USD) 
Programs/Projects funded 
Ministry of Infrastructure 18,180,515 Transportation; Water and 
Sanitation 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Animal Resources 
17,682,187 Intensification and Development of 
Sustainable Production Systems  
African 
Development 
Bank 
38,708,530 
Ministry of Education 2,845,828 Technical Vocational Education and 
Training (TVET) 
Ministry of Infrastructure 16,960,778 Transportation; Energy 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Animal Resources 
11,464,306 Intensification and Development of 
Sustainable Production Systems  
Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 
5,137,038 Promotion of Trade and Industry 
Ministry of Health 1,465,717 Development of National 
Specialized Reference and Research 
Systems 
International 
Development 
Association 
(World Bank) 
36,363,131 
Ministry of Public Service 
and Labour 
1,335,291 Capacity Building 
India 28,952,811 Ministry of Infrastructure 28,952,811 Energy 
Ministry of Health 28,343,371 Financial Accessibility to Health 
Services; Diseases Prevention; 
Diagnosis and Treatment of 
Diseases 
Global Fund 28,359,781 
Office of the Prime 
Minister 
16,409 Child Rights Promotion and 
Protection 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Animal Resources 
8,612,350 Intensification and Development of 
Sustainable Production Systems; 
Commodity Chain Production, 
Horticulture and Agribusiness 
Development; Institutional 
Development 
Ministry of Infrastructure 8,031,323 Energy; Water and Sanitation 
Ministry of Health 4,797,824 Development of Sector Institutional 
Capacity; Geographic Accessibility 
to Health Services; Development of 
National Specialized Reference and 
Research Systems; Diseases 
Prevention 
Ministry of Public Service 
and Labour 
1,595,187 Capacity Building 
Belgium 23,655,210 
Ministry of Forests and 
Mines 
618,527 Forest Management and 
Afforestation 
Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
19,596,655 Efficient Planning, Use of 
Resources and Budgeting 
Basket Fund 21,009,412 
Ministry of Health 1,412,756 Development of Sector Institutional 
Capacity 
Ministry of Infrastructure 7,592,920 Energy; Water and Sanitation 
Ministry of Forestry and 
Mines 
4,807,372 Forest Management and 
Afforestation 
Ministry of Local 
Government 
3,565,645 Good Governance and 
Decentralization; Community 
Development 
The 
Netherlands 
16,604,165 
Rwandan Supreme Court 638,228 Administration of Justice 
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International 
Fund for 
Agricultural 
Development 
11,188,940 Ministry of Agriculture and 
Animal Resources 
11,188,940 Intensification and Development of 
Sustainable Production Systems; 
Commodity Chain Promotion, 
Horticulture and Agribusiness; 
Institutional Development 
Organization 
of Petroleum-
Exporting 
Countries 
(OPEC) 
10,221,154 Ministry of Infrastructure 10,221,154 Transportation; Water and 
Sanitation 
European 
Union 
8,313,641 Ministry of Infrastructure 8,313,641 Energy; Housing and Urban 
Development; Water and Sanitation 
Ministry of Health 4,576,636 Geographic Accessibility to Health 
Services 
Saudi Fund for 
Development 
6,784,758 
Ministry of Infrastructure 2,208,122 Energy 
Ministry of Health 3,406,817 Geographic Accessibility to Health 
Services 
China 6,261,389 
Ministry of Infrastructure 2,854,572 Transportation 
Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund 
5,807,630 Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
5,807,630 Efficient Planning, Use of 
Resources and Budgeting; Resource 
Mobilization 
Ministry of Health 3,233,984 Development of Sector Institutional 
Capacity; Availability of Drugs and 
Consumables; Development of 
National Specialized Reference and 
Research Systems 
United States 5,010,487 
Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 
1,776,504 Promotion of Business Support 
Services and Cooperatives 
Ministry of Environment 
and Lands 
4,539,746 Environment and Climate 
Management 
Rwandan Supreme Court 223,967 Access to Justice 
United 
Nations 
Development 
Programme 
4,934,053 
Office of the Prime 
Minister 
170,341 Good Governance 
Arab Bank for 
Economic 
Development 
in Africa 
4,762,841 Ministry of Infrastructure 4,762,841 Transportation; Energy; Water and 
Sanitation 
Ministry of Youth 3,139,431 Youth Mobilization UNICEF 3,355,196 
Ministry of Infrastructure 215,765 Water and Sanitation 
Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 
2,350,073 Promotion of Trade and Industry Investment 
Climate 
Facility for 
Africa 
2,980,965 
Ministry of Infrastructure 630,892 Energy 
Korea Fund  2,891,538 Ministry of Infrastructure 2,891,538 Transportation 
Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
1,832,978 Resource Mobilization Department for 
International 
Development 
(United 
Kingdom) 
2,607,477 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Animal Resources 
774,499 Institutional Development 
 
Data source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, National Budget: Annex II-2: Revised 2010/2011: Projects by 
Ministry and Programme, (Kigali: The Republic of Rwanda, 2011). 
 
Rwandan Francs (RWF) converted to USD based on 03 March 2013 conversion rates: 1.00RWF=.00157723USD 
 
 
 
